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BANNING STATE RECOGNITION OF SAMESEX RELATIONSHIPS: CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF NEBRASKA’S
INITIATIVE 416
Christopher Rizzo*
INTRODUCTION
Nebraska is not unique in having passed a ban on state
recognition of some same-sex relationships—dozens of states
have done so.1 What is unprecedented is the breadth of
* The author is an attorney and Menapace Fellow at the Municipal Art
Society in New York City; practice areas include environmental, land use and
constitutional law as it relates to municipal governance. He is a graduate of
Manhattan College, 1997, and of Pace University School of Law, 2001. The
conclusions and opinions expressed in this article are exclusively those of the
author and do not represent any official or unofficial position of the Municipal
Art Society or any of its members.
1
See Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, State Legislative
Reactions to Suits for Same-Sex Marriage (April 2002) (listing Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington and
West Virginia as states, in addition to Nebraska, that have passed antimarriage laws intended to block in and out of state marriage licenses of samesex couples), available at http://www.buddybuddy.com/t-line-2.html; ALA.
CODE § 30-1-19 (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2002); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 25-901 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 2002);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2002);
FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-31 (2002); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 572-1 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 32-201 (Michie 2002); ILL.
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Nebraska’s law and the wide margin, seventy percent, by which
it was passed by voters in November 2000.2 The law, referred to
as “Initiative 416,” is the most far-reaching ban on same-sex
relationships in the United States, providing:
Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid
or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of
the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or
other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in Nebraska.3
This constitutional amendment, passed by popular initiative,4
reflects nationwide concern that recognition of marriage by
persons of the same sex will be mandated in states where no
explicit ban exists.5
COMP. STAT. 5/201 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (2001); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 402.005 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89
(West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 650, 701 (West 2002); MD.
CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-201 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 551.1,
551.271-72 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2002); MO. REV. STAT. §
451.022 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-103 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
14-03-01, 14-03-08 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3 (2002); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (Law. Co-op.
2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-3-113 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 482-104 (2002).
2
See Leslie Reed, Three Turning Points Shaped Mills, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Nov. 27, 2000, at 11 (describing popular support for the initiative
and the extensive campaign launched by Guyla Mills, a born-again Christian,
to gain support for the legislation). For an examination of the breadth of the
initiative, see infra Part II (setting forth the scope of the law and range of
relationships and legal arrangements affected).
3
NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29.
4
Laws passed by popular initiative are typically proposed, campaigned
for and voted upon by citizens rather than lawmakers. Initiative is defined as
“[a]n electoral process by which a percentage of voters can propose legislation
and compel a vote on it by the legislature or by the full electorate.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 788 (7th ed. 1999).
5
The most tangible example of this concern is the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”), passed by Congress in 1996. See 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (2002). DOMA grants states permission to deny recognition to samesex marriages created in other states and provides, in relevant part, “[n]o
State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
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The concern stems from decisions by state courts in Alaska,
Hawaii and Vermont holding that denying gays the right to
marry, and the rights associated with marriage, is unlawful.6
Other states, like Nebraska, feared that these decisions would
required to give effect to any public act . . . respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage . . . .” See also 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 (defining marriage as a legal union between a man and a woman). For
further discussion of DOMA’s effects upon state law and recognition of samesex relationships, see supra Part I.B (exploring the provisions of DOMA as a
response to potential state court recognition of same-sex marriage rights and
setting forth provisions of the statute). See also Evelyn Nieves, Ballot
Initiative That Would Thwart Gay Marriage is Embroiling California, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at A12 (discussing the controversial nature of
California’s Knight Initiative, which asks California voters to define marriage
in such a way that same-sex marriages from other states would not be
recognized).
6
See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super.
Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), aff’d, 21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001) (holding that Alaska’s
statutory ban on same-sex marriages denied plaintiffs their fundamental right
to choose life partners and implicated privacy and equal protection issues
under the Alaska Constitution); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
(requiring the state to show that its statute banning same-sex marriage met
strict scrutiny review to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (finding that the Common Benefits
Clause of the Vermont Constitution entitles same-sex couples to obtain the
same benefits and protections afforded opposite-sex couples under state law).
State legislatures in Hawaii and Vermont responded by offering varying
levels of marriage-like rights to gays. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
431:10-234 (addressing reciprocal beneficiaries’ rights in life insurance
policies) (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-212 (2000) (regarding the
right of election to surviving reciprocal beneficiaries); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 572c (1999) (providing for “reciprocal beneficiary relationships”);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (2002) (allowing same-sex couples to
establish “civil union” relationships, which enables them to receive the
benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of married
spouses); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002) (describing the benefits,
protections and responsibilities of parties to a civil union, which include the
responsibility for support, application of laws relating to annulment,
separation, divorce, child custody, property division and maintenance, group
insurance for state employees, medical care, family leave benefits, workers’
compensation benefits, public assistance benefits and marital evidentiary
privilege among others).
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foster gay marriage in their states and responded with bans.7 The
underlying source of these concerns is the requirement under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
that the states recognize legal decisions of other states.8 Thus,
numerous states have passed laws prohibiting recognition of a
same-sex marriage, even if valid when performed in another
state.9 The ban enacted in Nebraska, however, goes beyond
marriage and discusses other relationships like “domestic
partnerships,” “civil unions” and “other” relationships.10 States
are permitted to regulate marriage, but the scope and content of
Initiative 416 raises questions about whether the amendment is a
7

The federal government responded as well with DOMA. See H.R. REP.
NO. 104-664 (1996) (stating that the report is “a response to a very particular
development in the State of Hawaii. . . . The prospect of permitting
homosexual couples to ‘marry’ in Hawaii threatens to have very real
consequences both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage
laws) of the various States.”). Id.; see also YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR
SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 229 (2002) (noting that in response to the
Hawaii decision, thirty-five states passed laws in the five year period between
1996 and 2001 that “restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples by specifically
defining marriage as a union between persons of the opposite sex, specifically
prohibiting marriage between persons of the same sex in the state, and
avoiding recognition of same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other
states”). For further discussion of DOMA, see infra Part I.B.
8
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause reads,
“[f]ull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” Id. See also MERIN,
supra note 7, at 231. Merin notes:
If same sex marriage is legalized in one or more states, the question
will arise whether marriages performed there are to be recognized in
other jurisdictions. It is debatable whether the U.S. Constitution will
compel such recognition, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause
has not commonly been relied upon by courts in determining whether
they should recognize out-of-state marriages (e.g., common law
marriages) that could not have been performed within the jurisdiction.
Id.
9
See supra note 1 (listing states that have passed DOMAs).
10
NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29.

RIZZOMACRO 3-14.DOC

4/1/03 2:52 PM

NEBRASKA’S INITIATIVE 416

5

valid exercise of the state’s power to determine who can and
cannot be married.11
Litigation over the amendment’s constitutionality is almost
certain.12 The real conflict, however, is taking place among
American citizens as changing values and attitudes towards
homosexuality are reflected in courts and legislatures across the
country.13 As the Supreme Court of Hawaii aptly noted, “with all
11

Marriage is inarguably a domestic matter, and it is well established that
“there is no federal law of domestic relations.” De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351
U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (holding that the court must look to state law in
determining whether an illegitimate child is included within the term
“children” as used in the federal Copyright Act); see also Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction in
federal courts for domestic relations cases); Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the law of the states, and not to the laws of
the United States.”); Salisbury v. Lust, 501 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D. Nev. 1980)
(“The power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function retained by the
states; it has not been granted to the federal government.”); O’Neill v. Dent,
364 F. Supp. 565, 569 n.6 (E.D.N.Y 1973) (“[S]ubject to constitutional
limitations, the legislatures of the States are authorized to regulate the
qualifications of the contracting parties, the forms or procedures necessary to
solemnize the marriage, the various duties and obligations which it creates,
and the procedures for dissolution”).
12
See American Civil Liberties Union, Statewide Anti-Gay Marriage
Laws (Jan. 31, 1998), at http://www. aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGay
Rights.cfm?ID=9211&c=. The ACLU maintains that anti-gay marriage laws
violate various constitutional provisions, including full faith and credit and
equal protection, as well as the right to interstate travel as established by the
Supreme Court. Id.
13
In fact, the number of states with nondiscrimination laws banning
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation increases nearly every year.
For an updated, annual compilation and analysis of such legislation, see
National Gay Lesbian and Lesbian Task Force, State Legislative Tracking and
Reporting (providing year-round legislative tracking and reporting as well as
an annual analysis report for all state legislative activity pertaining to lesbian,
gay, bi-sexual and trans-gendered issues), at http://www.ngltf.org/statelocal/
tracking.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
For example, New Jersey’s non-discrimination statute protects gays from
discrimination in employment and public accommodations:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to
obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges
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due respect to the Virginia Courts of a bygone era, we do not
believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on Divine
Will, and . . . constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that
customs change with an evolving social order.”14 The court was
referring to the opinion by the Virginia courts upholding the ban
on mixed-race marriages, an opinion that was overturned by the
United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Commonwealth of
Virginia.15 Similarly, state courts in Alaska, Hawaii and Vermont
mandated equal rights for gays, even though the legislatures had
not previously done so.16
of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination
because of . . . sexual orientation . . . . This opportunity is
recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2001).
Additionally, contentious public hearings held in Nebraska while Initiative
416 was under consideration demonstrate the deep divisions that exist over this
issue. For a full account of these debates and the issues raised therein, see
generally Initiative Measures 415 and 416: Hearing Before the Committee on
Education, 96th Leg., 2d Sess. (2000) [hereinafter Hearing Before the
Committee on Education]; Initiative Measures 415 and 416; Hearing
Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, 96th Leg., 2d Sess. (Oct. 11, 12,
2000) [hereinafter Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State].
14
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (stating that
although the Virginia courts in the 1800s may have “declared that interracial
marriage simply could not exist because the Deity had deemed such a union
intrinsically unnatural, and, in effect, because it had theretofore never been the
‘custom’ of the state to recognize mixed marriages,” current courts must apply
constitutional law recognizing changing customs and social standards) (quoting
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967))). This article references Baehr v.
Lewin in short citation form as Baehr I to distinguish it from Baehr v. Miike,
1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), on remand from 910 P.2d
112 (Haw. 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), which involved the same
group of plaintiffs.
15
147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966), rev’d 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
16
See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (finding that the “recognition of one’s choice of a
life partner is a fundamental right and therefore the state must have a
compelling interest to refuse the exercise of that right by same-sex partners”);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (reversing the trial court’s judgment
and retaining jurisdiction pending legislative action because the State was
constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits
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This article does not focus on the fundamental right to marry
or the first sentence of the Nebraska law concerning same-sex
marriage.17 Rather, the article explores the second sentence of
Initiative 416, which goes beyond a mere ban on marriage and
states that Nebraska shall not recognize “a civil union, domestic
partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship.”18 Part I
provides the history of state recognition of same-sex relationships
and the controversy it has caused in many states.19 Part II
and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law); Baehr I, 852
P.2d at 68 (remanding the case for a hearing to determine whether Hawaii’s
marriage license law furthered compelling state interests and was narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessarily violating plaintiffs’ equal protection rights).
17
This does not reflect the author’s conclusions about the constitutionality
of the ban on gay marriage. This ban has several constitutional implications,
including violation of the fundamental right to marry, due process, gender
discrimination, equal protection and discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Hawaii’s court first considered the ban on gay marriage as a
denial of the fundamental right to marry and gender discrimination. See
generally Baehr I, 852 P.2d 44. Alaska considered claims of gender
discrimination as well as denial of the right to choose a life partner. See
Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *5-6. Finally, Vermont’s Supreme Court directly
addressed the issue of sexual orientation discrimination. See Baker, 744 A.2d
at 886-87.
A thorough examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this article.
For thoughtful discussions and analysis of these and other similarly compelling
matters, see Nan D. Hunter, Millennium Speech the Sex Discrimination
Argument In Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 397 (2001) (arguing that laws
that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in fact discriminate on the
basis of sex and examining the impacts of feminist jurisprudence, as well as
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights); Arthur S. Leonard, Ten
Propositions About Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partners, 30 CAP. U. L.
REV. 343 (2002) (discussing the various ramifications of legal recognition of
same-sex partners on equality for homosexuals, as well as achieving access to
marriage and strategies to do so); John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek,
Can Homosexual Equal Protection Claims Withstand the Implications of
Bowers v. Hardwick?, 50 CATH. U. L. REV.703 (2001) (discussing the
difficulty for a homosexual to bring a federal equal protection claim as long as
Bowers v. Hardwick remains good law).
18
NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29.
19
It should be noted that some suggest that same-sex unions may not
necessarily reflect the participants’ sexual orientation, but rather the desire to
take advantage of tenant or inheritance laws. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.
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considers the scope of the Nebraska amendment with its broad
language, and the potential impact it may have beyond the
context of gay marriage. Once the scope of the law is established,
Part III considers equal protection concerns raised by the second
sentence of Initiative 416, which bars recognition of nonmarriage unions between same-sex partners but not opposite-sex
partners. Given that state courts are generally required to
recognize judicial decisions and contracts from other states,
Section IV examines the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution and issues that the law will raise in
this context.20 Section V considers whether Initiative 416 will
impair contracts between same-sex partners, implicating the
Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.21 Finally,
Section VI concludes that the Initiative 416 does violate the
Constitution in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v.
Evans.22
ANN. § 572C-2 (2000) (establishing that persons with significant emotional,
personal and economic relationships who are legally prohibited from
marrying, for example brothers and sisters, uncles and nieces, or individuals
of the same sex, can receive the same rights and benefits as married couples as
reciprocal beneficiaries); Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New
Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15, 42 n.152 (2000) (discussing how
any two people can register as reciprocal beneficiaries under Hawaii Law and
obtain benefits similar to those received by registered lesbian or gay couples).
This article uses the terms “gay relationship” and “same-sex relationship”
interchangeably.
20
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 160
(1901) (explaining that the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit clause is to
“give the same conclusive effect to the judgments of all the States, so as to
promote certainty and uniformity in the rule among them”); supra note 8
(quoting the Full Faith and Credit Clause). For further explanation, see infra
Part IV.
21
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Contracts Clause reads, “No State
shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . .” Id.;
see also GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 506 (13th ed. 1997) (explaining the main purpose of the “contracts
clause was to restrain state laws affecting private contracts,” especially as they
related to debtor relief laws). For further explanation, see infra Part V.
22
517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, homosexuals and municipalities
challenged the validity and enforcement of Amendment 2 to the Colorado

RIZZOMACRO 3-14.DOC

4/1/03 2:52 PM

NEBRASKA’S INITIATIVE 416
I.

9

THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CONTROVERSY

For many years marriage was universally considered a
relationship between a man and a woman.23 Same-sex couples
that challenged state laws that denied them the right to marry
invariably lost.24 For example in 1974 in Singer v. Hara, the
Supreme Court of Washington found that the state’s law clearly
defined marriage as between a man and a woman.25 The court
first noted that states are given the exclusive power to regulate
marriage and determine which persons are eligible to be
married.26 Accordingly, in Singer, the legal challenge to
Washington’s law ended with the judicial determination that the
state had exercised this authority and defined marriage as

Constitution which precludes all legislative, executive or judicial action at the
state or local level designed to protect the status of persons based on their
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.” Id. at 624. The Court held that Amendment 2 violated the
Equal Protection Clause and “classified homosexuals . . . [so] to make them
unequal to everyone else” and strangers to the laws of Colorado. Id. at 635.
23
See Laurence Drew Borten, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in
Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089 (2002) (stating that marriage revolves
around sexual intercourse and has always been the legal union of a man and
woman); Lynne Marie Kohm & Mark A. Yarhouse, Fairness, Accuracy and
Honesty in Discussing Homosexuality and Marriage, 14 REGENT U. L. REV.
249 (2001) (stating that marriage has always been a fundamental constitutional
right but that there are “minimum requirements to marry [,which] include: the
parties being of minimum age, one at a time, unrelated by blood or marriage,
and of different sexes”).
24
See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding
that the Washington marriage statute prohibits same-sex marriages and does
not violate the equal rights amendment to the Washington State Constitution);
see also Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (holding that there is
no constitutional protection of the right of marriage between persons of the
same sex, and that two women cannot enter into a marriage).
25
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189. Specifically, the court noted that, despite a
1970 amendment that replaced “male” and “female” with “persons,” the
legislature still intended not to authorize same-sex marriage, as was evident in
the use of “male” and “female” on the affidavit for issuance of a marriage
license. Id.
26
Id. at 1197.
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between a man and a woman.27 Specifically, the court noted that
the law made reference to “‘the male’ and ‘the female’ which
clearly dispel[led] any suggestion that the legislature intended to
authorize same-sex marriages.”28
A. State Responses
The first changes came when state courts in Hawaii and
Alaska interpreted their state constitutions to guarantee gays the
right to marry.29 In Baehr v. Lewin, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii found that denying gays the right to marry was gender
discrimination.30 The court applied “strict scrutiny” to what it
called a sex-based classification.31 The state was ordered to
demonstrate that the law “further[ed] compelling state interests
and [was] narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of
constitutional rights.”32 Later, when the state’s response to the
court order was considered in Baehr v. Miike, the court found
that the state had failed to show a compelling reason for denying
gays this right.33 Faced with the prospect that the state’s court
27

Id. (“[W]e are unable to say that there is not a rational basis upon
which the state may limit the protection of its marriage laws to the legal union
of one man and one woman.”).
28
Id. at 1189. The court also rejected a challenge based upon gender
discrimination, as plaintiffs claimed that the Washington marriage statutes
violated their equal rights under the Washington State Constitution because
allowing a man to marry a woman but not another man is a classification made
based upon sex. Id. at 1191-92. The court pointed out, however, that same-sex
marriage licenses are denied equally to both male and female pairs, and
therefore the marriage statutes do not violate equal rights. Id.
29
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii’s
Constitution restricting marriage to male and female is sex-based
discrimination); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding that the marriage code in Alaska’s
Constitution is also sex-based discrimination).
30
Baehr I, 852 P.2d at 44.
31
Id. at 67.
32
Id. at 68.
33
See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996),
on remand from 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw.
1997). The court declared that sex based discrimination invoked strict
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would require gay marriage in the state, Hawaiians amended
their constitution to read that “the legislature shall have the
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”34 Unlike
Nebraska’s Initiative 416, however, Hawaii’s amendment does
not address non-marital same-sex relationships like “domestic
partnerships.”35 Hawaii’s law is also limited to public recognition
of marriage rights, stating that private solemnization is not
unlawful.36
To remedy some of the inequities acknowledged by the court,
scrutiny, and thus the state bore the burden of showing that it had a
compelling interest and narrowly tailored means for achieving that interest. Id.
at *19. The state failed to overcome its presumption that the restriction was
unconstitutional because it failed to present sufficient evidence that the optimal
development of children is adversely affected when same-sex couples raise
children. Id. at *21. Further, the state failed to show that allowing same-sex
marriage would negatively affect public policy, assure that Hawaii marriages
are recognized in other states, or any other important state interest. Id. at *22.
34
HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii
Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV.
19, 26-27 (2000) (noting that the “Marriage Amendment” was a direct
response by opponents of the Baehr I decision seeking to prevent the inevitable
ability of same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses in the state).
35
The significance of this legislative approach is illustrated by comparing
the text of Hawaii’s amendment to Nebraska’s. Hawaii’s legislature focused
only on marriage and used terminology making the act of marriage one that is
“reserved” for opposite sex couples, and there is no mention of same-sex
couples. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. Hawaii’s Constitution states simply,
“[t]he legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples.” Id. (emphasis added). Instead of reserving the right for some, the
Nebraska legislature framed the issue as a restriction against the behavior of
same-sex couples. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29. It states, “[o]nly marriage
between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The
uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership,
or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in
Nebraska.” Id. (emphasis added).
36
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.6 (2002). The statute states, “Nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to render unlawful, or otherwise
affirmatively punishable at law, the solemnization of same-sex relationships by
religious organizations; provided that nothing in this section shall be construed
to confer any of the benefits, burdens or obligations of marriage under the
laws of Hawaii.” Id.
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Hawaii’s legislature quickly moved to provide same-sex couples
with some rights traditionally reserved to married couples.37 For
example, same-sex partners in Hawaii can now register to
become “reciprocal beneficiaries.”38 Parties to these agreements
need not be gay, simply of the same-sex and willing to prepare a
notarized declaration of their relationship.39 Some of the rights
extended include the right of election for surviving spouses and
reciprocal beneficiaries,40 the right to life insurance for a
partner41 and hospital visitation rights.42
37

See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw. 1993) (noting that
on its face the statute “denies same-sex couples access to the marital status and
its concomitant rights and benefits. It is the State’s regulation of access to the
status of married persons, on the basis of the applicants’ sex, that gives rise to
the question whether the applicant couples have been denied the equal
protection of the laws.”).
38
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-5 (2002). The statute states that “[t]wo
persons . . . may enter into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship and register
their relationship as reciprocal beneficiaries by filing a signed notarized
declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship with the director.” Id.
39
See id.
40
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-212 (2002).
The right of election may be exercised only by a surviving spouse or
reciprocal beneficiary who is living when the petition for the elective
share is filed in the court under section 560:2-211(a). If the election is
not exercised by the surviving spouse or reciprocal beneficiary
personally, it may be exercised on the surviving spouse’s or
reciprocal beneficiary’s behalf by the spouse’s or reciprocal
beneficiary’s conservator, guardian, or agent under the authority of a
power of attorney.
Id. (emphasis added).
41
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-234 (2002).
Every life insurance policy made payable to or for the benefit of the
spouse or the reciprocal beneficiary of the insured, and every life
insurance policy assigned, transferred, or in any way made payable to
a spouse or reciprocal beneficiary, or to a trustee for the benefit of a
spouse or a reciprocal beneficiary, regardless of how the assignment
or transfer is procured, shall, unless contrary to the terms of the
policy, inure to the separate use and benefit of such spouse or
reciprocal beneficiary.
Id.
42
HAW. REV. STAT. § 323-2 (2002). The statute states that a “reciprocal

RIZZOMACRO 3-14.DOC

4/1/03 2:52 PM

NEBRASKA’S INITIATIVE 416

13

State courts in Alaska also addressed this issue and found
denying gays and lesbians the right to marry unconstitutional
under state law.43 The court first considered the right to privacy
and the right to “choice of life partner.”44 Although marriage to a
partner of the same-sex is not a fundamental right in Alaska,
because no such right is rooted in tradition, the court found that
the right to choose a life partner is.45 Denial of this right merited
beneficiary, as defined in chapter 572C, of a patient shall have the same rights
as a spouse with respect to visitation and making health care decisions for the
patient.” Id.
43
See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). Plaintiffs, two men, sought and were denied a
marriage license by the State of Alaska. Id. at *1. Thereafter, they filed a
complaint seeking a declaration that the prohibition of same-gender marriage
violated the Alaska Constitution. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a ruling
on the level of scrutiny to be applied in review of the Marriage Code. Id. In
finding that the choice of a life partner implicates constitutional provisions,
namely the right to privacy and equal protection, the parties were ordered to
determine whether a compelling state interest could be shown for the ban on
same-sex marriage. Id. at *6. In 2001, the Alaska Supreme Court heard from
the same plaintiffs on the matter of whether a same-sex couple precluded from
marrying may be denied benefits that are legally available only to married
people. See Brause v. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 21
P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001). The court affirmed dismissal of the claim on the
grounds that no actual controversy was ripe for adjudication. Id. The standard
for determining ripeness, as articulated by the Alaska Supreme Court,
depended on “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship
to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. at 359 (quoting Lake
Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506 (1972)). According to the
court, the plaintiffs did not allege that they ever had or would be deprived
rights available exclusively to married persons and “to the extent that the need
to decide is a function of the probability that they will suffer an anticipated
injury, [plaintiffs] failed to demonstrate such a need.” Id. at 360.
44
Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1. The plaintiffs claimed that the right of
privacy encompassed the right to choose one’s life partner as an important and
personal choice, necessitating a compelling interest by the State to justify
interference. Id.
45
Id. at *4. The court recognized that marriage between a man and
woman is a deeply rooted tradition and, therefore, a fundamental right. Id.
(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)). Yet the question invoked here—“whether the personal
decision [to] choose a mate of the same gender will be recognized as the same
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strict scrutiny, and the court ordered the state to demonstrate a
compelling interest.46 In fact, it criticized the Hawaiian court’s
historical approach to determining if gay marriage was a
fundamental right, stating: “It is self-evident that same-sex
marriage is not ‘accepted’ or ‘rooted in the traditions and
collective conscience’ of the people. Were this not the case [the
plaintiffs] would not have had to file complaints seeking precisely
this right.”47 Rather, the relevant question was whether the
choice of a “life partner” was rooted in tradition.48 The court
found that it clearly was.49
Like the court in Hawaii, Alaska’s court also found that the
ban on same-sex relationships was gender discrimination, saying,
“Sex-based classification can hardly be more obvious.”50 The
Alaskan constitution contains a strongly worded antidiscrimination clause that states, “Civil Rights: no person is to be
denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of
race, color, creed, sex or national origin.”51 As in Hawaii, strict

fundamental right”—is decided by answering whether the choice, as opposed
to the existence of same-sex marriage, is within the realm of the fundamental
right of privacy. Id.
46
Id. at *6.
47
Id. at *4. The court referred to Baehr v. Lewin, and concluded that
“the Hawaii court could reach such a conclusion because of the question it
chose to ask”—whether same-sex marriage is a deeply rooted tradition. Id.;
see also Baehr I, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
48
Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *4.
49
Id. The court found that freedom to choose a life partner is a
fundamental right subject to denial only if the state had a compelling interest.
Id. at *1. Government intrusion into the choice of a life partner “encroache[d]
on the intimate personal decisions of the individual,” and the choice can
include persons of the opposite or of the same sex. Id. at *5. The court noted
that because the right to marry and raise a traditional family is constitutionally
protected, the right to “choose one’s life partner and have a recognized nontraditional family” should also be protected. Id. at *6.
50
Id. See also Baehr I, 852 P.2d at 562-79 (finding that the Hawaii
statute limiting marriage certificates to male-female couples was a clear
showing of discrimination based on sex, implicating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Hawaii Constitution).
51
ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 3.
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scrutiny was applied.52 Ultimately, however, the litigation ended
by a constitutional amendment defining marriage to exist “only
between one man and one woman.”53
Advocates of same-sex marriage had their most significant
legal victory in Vermont.54 Vermont’s constitution contains a
unique “Common Benefits Clause,” stating “that government is,
or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and
security of the people, nation or community and not for the
52

See Baehr I, 852 P.2d at 571 (stating that whenever denial of equal
protection of laws is alleged, a strict scrutiny standard should be applied to
determine whether there is a compelling state interest and whether the statute
in question is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessarily violating a plaintiff’s
equal protection under the law); see also Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *6
(holding that the strict scrutiny test is applicable to review a statute when it
denies the fundamental right to choose one’s life partner).
53
See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this
State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.”). This
section took effect on January 3, 1999, and the amendment is the result of a
referendum voted on by the Alaska electorate in November 1998, shortly after
Brause was decided. Id. See also Mark Strasser, From Colorado to Alaska by
Way of Cincinnati: On Romer, Equality Foundation, and the Constitutionality
of Referenda, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1193, 1194 (1999). The referendum
reportedly passed by a 2 to 1 majority. Id. at 1247 n.373. The amendment
forms a strong barrier to same-sex marriages being allowed in Alaska because
now the power to allow such unions no longer exists in the legislator but
instead the ban is embedded in the State’s constitution. Id. at 1247-49. The
Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged the amendment by declaring the relevant
counts of an appeal of a same-sex couple’s denial of a marriage licenses to be
“moot” in light of the amendment. See Brause v. State Dep’t of Health & Soc.
Servs., 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001).
54
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Same-sex couples
brought an action against the State of Vermont seeking a declaratory judgment
that a refusal to issue them marriage licenses violated the state’s marriage
statutes and Constitution. Id. The court held that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the benefits and protections granted under the state marriage law
violated the common benefits clause of the State Constitution. Id. The
significance of this legal battle was noted by the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force—Policy Institute director Paula Ettelbrick stated in a press release
that “the decision is a significant step forward for our community.” See
National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Vermont Begins to Pave the Way for
Fairness for Same-Sex Couples (Dec. 20, 1999), at http://www.ngltf.org/
news/release.cfm?releaseID=254.
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particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family
or set of persons, who are of party only of the community.”55 In
Baker v. Vermont, the Supreme Court of Vermont directly
addressed the issue of sexual orientation based discrimination
under this Common Benefits Clause, rather than considering the
issue of gender discrimination.56 The decision held that barring
gay marriage, or at least the rights associated with marriage, was
unconstitutional.57 Following this decision, and unlike in Hawaii
and Alaska, Vermont’s legislators did not undertake complicated
55

See VT. CONST. art. 7, chap. I; see also Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. The
plaintiffs argued that:
[I]n denying them access to a civil marriage license, the law
effectively excludes them from a broad array of legal benefits and
protections incident to the marital relation, including access to a
spouse’s medical, life, and disability insurance, hospital visitation and
other medical decision making privileges, spousal support, intestate
succession, homestead protections, and many other statutory
protections.
Id. at 870. In addition, the plaintiffs contested the trial court’s holding that the
statute “served the State’s interest in promoting the ‘link between procreation
and child rearing.’” Id. In support of this argument the plaintiffs asserted that
a large number of married couples chose to remain childless, while a growing
number of same-sex couples had children. Id. In essence, they demonstrated
the paradox in “recognize[ing] the rights of same-sex partners as parents, yet
deny[ing] them—and their children—the [rights of] spouses.” Id.
56
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 880. The court held that the statute did not
discriminate on the basis of gender because “the marriage laws are facially
neutral; they do not single out men or women as a class for disparate
treatment, but rather prohibit men and women equally from marrying a person
of the same sex.” Id. But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
(reversing a trial court decision barring same-sex marriages and remanding for
further proceedings to determine whether the statute discriminated on the basis
of gender).
57
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 884.
The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage license are
of such significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be
grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and
authority . . . . Considered in light of the extreme logical disjunction
between the classification and the stated purposes of the law . . . the
exclusion falls substantially short of this standard.
Id.
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constitutional amendments to bar legal recognition of same-sex
relationships and marriages.58 Rather, Vermont opted to provide
gays with an alternative to marriage: “civil unions.”59 The civil
58

For a discussion of the constitutional amendments that followed judicial
decisions in Hawaii and Alaska, see supra notes 36-42, 53 and accompanying
text.
59
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (1999). Specifically, the statute
provides that for a valid civil union to be established, the parties must “(1)
[n]ot be party to another civil union or a marriage; (2) [b]e of the same sex
and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state; [and] (3) [m]eet
the criteria and obligations set forth in 18 V.S.A. chapter 106.” Id. A full
discussion of Vermont’s civil union statute is beyond the scope of this article,
although it has been the subject of substantial writing, research and analysis,
both in the popular media and in academic journals. For further analysis, see
Tonja Jacobi, Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont: Implications of Legislative
Remand for the Judiciary’s Role, 26 VT. L. REV. 381 (2002) (examining the
judiciary’s role in deferring to the legislature in determining social policy); Jill
Jourdan, The Effects of Civil Unions on Vermont Children, VT. B.J., March
28, 2002, at 32 (discussing the benefits that children of same-sex couples
receive as a result of Vermont’s civil union legislation); Mary LaFrance,
Defining Marriage: What Ballot Question 2 Doesn’t Do, NEV. LAW., Oct. 10,
2002, at 15 (describing how the Vermont Assembly addressed the issue of
religious freedom in adopting the Vermont civil union law); Arthur S.
Leonard, Chronicling a Movement: 20 Years of Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 415, 556 (2000) (stating that Vermont’s
legislation, by avoiding labeling the civil union a marriage, “has deprived
couples who are civilly united from being able to argue that other states are
required to recognize their status under the settled principles of comity that
states follow in recognizing out-of-state marriages”); Mark Strasser, Same-Sex
Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise and Constitutional
Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 597, 608 (2002) (analyzing the array of
reactions to Vermont’s civil union statute and concluding that although
Vermont’s approach currently strikes an appropriate balance, future
amendments should remove the separate status and allow same-sex marriage).
Various advocacy groups and organizations also provide updated legal
information regarding laws that affect same-sex couples and the legal options
available under civil union legislation. See generally Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund, at http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2003);
American Civil Liberties Union, at http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/
LesbianGayRightsMain.cfm; National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, at http://
www.ngltf.org; Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/
legal/lgln (providing monthly legal updates on court rulings, legislation, and
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union is available only to couples that are “of the same sex and
[are] therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state.”60
The law essentially grants to gay couples all the rights and
responsibilities associated with marriage. These include divorce
laws, estate laws, joint tax status, adoption rights and insurance
rights.61
B. The Federal Response
The federal government has also enacted legislation barring
recognition of same-sex relationships.62 The federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) was passed in 1996, following the
Supreme Court of Hawaii’s decision in Baehr I, and prior to the
Vermont court’s decision in Baker v. Vermont.63 The law has two
other legal developments affecting gays and lesbians) (last visited Mar. 3,
2003).
60
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202 (2002).
61
See id. at § 1204. Section 1204 provides a “nonexclusive list of legal
benefits, protections and responsibilities of spouses, which shall apply in like
manner to parties to a civil union.” Id. Some of the protections and
responsibilities include domestic relation law, probate and adoption law and
procedure, state employee insurance, and state and local tax laws. Id. For a
full discussion of domestic partnership rules and arrangements as they pertain
to conflict of law issues and recognition of such arrangement between and
amongst the various states, see generally Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and
Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflicts of Laws Questions and
Concerns, 2001 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1235 (2001) (addressing potential conflicts of
laws recognizing domestic partnerships with issues of personal jurisdiction and
choice of law).
62
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2002); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2002).
63
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 5 (1996). Congress, responding
directly to developments in Hawaii, stated:
It is, of course, no business of Congress how the Hawaiian Supreme
Court interprets the Hawaiian Constitution, and the Committee
expresses no opinion on the propriety of the ruling in Baehr. But the
Committee does think it significant that the threat to traditional
marriage laws in Hawaii and elsewhere has come about because two
judges of one state Supreme Court have given credence to a legal
theory being advanced by gay rights lawyers.
Id.
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operative provisions. The first provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.64
The second provision states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies or of the United
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.65
Relying on Singer v. Hara,66 Congress passed DOMA not
only to “defend traditional marriage” at the federal level, but to
allow states to avoid the “orchestrated legal assault being waged
against” state control of the definition of marriage.67 The result
Other commentators have also noted that the federal DOMA statute was
passed in response to the Hawaii court decision. See, e.g., Theodora Ooms,
The Role of the Federal Government in Strengthening Marriage, 9 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 163, 172 (2001) (explaining how conservative advocacy groups’
anxieties about same-sex marriages “increased in light of state court of Hawaii
rulings,” which urged Congress to pass DOMA by a large majority); Brett P.
Ryan, Love and Let Love: Same-Sex Marriage, Past, Present, and Future, and
the Constitutionality of DOMA, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 185, 214 (2000)
(utilizing the fact that DOMA was developed in response to the “possibility—
and fear—that same-sex marriage might soon become legal, at least in Hawaii”
in an argument that DOMA is unconstitutional).
64
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
65
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
66
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 32 (1996). Specifically, a prepared
statement by Lynn D. Wardle noted, “the definition of ‘marriage’ is derived
from a case from the State of Washington, Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1191-92 (Wash. App. 1974).” Id.
67
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 10 (1996). The “background and need
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for same-sex couples is profound—1,049 federal statutes deal
with married couples, conferring hundreds of rights and
responsibilities upon them.68 The federal law, however, is not
nearly as broad as Nebraska’s Initiative 416. In fact, not only
does the text explicitly mention only marriage, the legislative
committee that drafted the law stated that “the committee would
emphasize the narrowness of this provision.”69
for legislation” section of the report states that “the Committee believes it is
important to place that development in its larger context. In particular, it is
critical to understand the nature of the orchestrated legal assault being waged
against traditional heterosexual marriage by gay rights groups and their
lawyers.” Id.
68
See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Denying Access to
Marriage Harms the Family (noting that “[a]t the federal level, civil marriage
is a gateway to more than 1049 protections, benefits, and obligations”),
available at http://www.lambalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record
=873 (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). The statute count was performed by the
Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund and presented by Robert
Pileggi, at a lecture at Columbia Law School on February 24, 2000.
69
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 21 (1996). Specifically, the Committee
stated:
This section provides that ‘(n)o State . . . shall be required to give
effect’ to same-sex ‘marriage’ licenses issued by another State. The
Committee would emphasize the narrowness of this provision.
Section 2 merely provides that, in the event Hawaii (or some other
State) permits same-sex couples to ‘marry, other States will not be
obligated or required, by operation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution, to recognize that ‘marriage,’
or any right or claim arising from it.
Id.
This is not to suggest that, if challenged, the federal DOMA would
necessarily pass constitutional muster. In fact, a number of commentators have
suggested that it would not. See, e.g., Leonard G. Brown III, Constitutionally
Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v. Evans and the
Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 159, 165 (1996)
(discussing the debate over the constitutionality of DOMA); James M.
Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist
Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335, 338 (1997) (concluding that
DOMA is unconstitutional because it has crossed the line between secular and
religious and betrays the Establishment Clause of the Constitution); Scott
Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of
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Passage of the federal DOMA was followed by thirty-five
“mini DOMAs” at the state level.70 Like the federal law, these
state statutes ban recognition of gay marriage performed within
or without the state. For example, Idaho passed a ban on
recognition of gay marriages performed in other states.71 The ban
was particularly meaningful because Idaho’s constitution contains
Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1450 (1997) (finding that
Congress exceeded its authority in interpreting the Full Faith and Credit
Clause); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal
Defects in H.R. 3396 and S. 1740, the Proposed Federal Legislation on
Marriage and the Constitution, Lambda Legal, Sept. 1, 1996 (finding that the
proposed statutes are unconstitutional because the statutes attempt to
circumvent the Full Faith and Credit Clause, abridge fundamental rights
including the right to marry and the right to travel, and nationalize domestic
law), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record?
record=80#N_25_.
70
See supra note 1 (listing states that have passed DOMAs); see also
Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of the Minnesota Defense of
Marriage Act: Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and Purposeful
Discrimination, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 407 (1998) (discussing the
constitutionality of the Minnesota Defense of Marriage Act); Nancy J.
Feather, Defense of Marriage Acts: An Analysis Under State Constitutional
Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1017 (1997) (arguing that state enacted defense of
marriage acts may often be unconstitutional because state constitutions tend to
offer greater protection than the Federal Constitution in the area of individual
rights including privacy, equal rights and equal protection); Mark Strasser,
When is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presumptions
of Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 305 (2001) (discussing state
versions of the Defense of Marriage Act); Partners Task Force for Gay &
Lesbian Couples, State Legislative Reactions to Suits for Same-Sex Marriage
(April 2002) (noting which states have passed anti-marriage laws and detailing
the years in which these laws were enacted), available at http://www.buddy
buddy.com/toc.html.
71
See IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 2000).
All marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid by
the laws of the state or country in which the same were contracted,
are valid in this state, unless they violate the public policy of this
state. Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but
are not limited to, same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into
under the laws of another state or country with the intent to evade the
prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state.
Id.
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a common benefits clause similar to Vermont’s.72
C. Nebraska Law and Same-Sex Partners
Nebraska sought to pass its own ban on gay marriage as well.
For example, the attorney general of Nebraska was asked by the
legislature to recommend the best method of defending the state’s
“traditional” marriage against the court decision in Hawaii.73
This report suggested that the nation’s only unicameral legislature
pass a ban on gay marriage to allow the federal DOMA to be
effective in Nebraska.74 It stated that “[w]ithout affirmative
legislation on the subject, Nebraska would most likely be
subjected to litigation in an attempt to force recognition of samesex marriage licenses issued in Hawaii.”75 Hawaii never did
recognize same-sex marriage, and Nebraska never passed such a
72

See IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 2. This clause, titled “Political power
inherent in the people,” states:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted
for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter,
reform or abolish the same whenever they may deem it necessary;
and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may
not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature.
Id. For a discussion of Vermont’s Common Benefits Clause, see supra note
55.
73
See Same-sex Marriage - Impact of Baehr v. Lewin and the Defense of
Marriage Act on Nebraska Law, Op. Neb. Att’y. Gen. 96090 (1996)
[hereinafter Op. Neb. Att’y Gen.]. With respect to the decision in Hawaii, the
Attorney General said:
New Legislation expressly prohibiting or excluding recognition of
same-sex marriages under Nebraska law is the only certain way to
avoid the possibility that Nebraska could be forced to recognize samesex marriage licenses issued in Hawaii. Given the existing uncertainty
under Nebraska law, additional legislation would be required to
ensure that Nebraska would be protected under DOMA.
Id.
74
Id. See also Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting
Benefits, 76 NEB. L. REV. 791 (1997) (explaining Nebraska’s unicameral
system, the way in which bills and legislation are passed by unicameral
government and how it differs from other states’ bicameral legislatures).
75
See Op. Neb. Att’y Gen., supra note 73, at 2.
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ban.76 This prompted activists opposing same-sex marriage to
pursue a popular initiative.77 The result is Initiative 416 and a
near-certain legal challenge.78
II. THE SCOPE OF INITIATIVE 416
The scope of the second sentence of Initiative 416 is not
immediately clear on the face of the law. In addition to the first
sentence’s ban on gay marriage, the second sentence
encompasses “civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other
similar same-sex relationships.”79 While Nebraska courts have
yet to define these terms, they have plenty of guiding precedent
from other jurisdictions to interpret the second sentence of
Initiative 416 to mean something more than a marriage.80
Additionally, drafts of the law that were not submitted to the
voters also demonstrate that the second sentence of the
amendment targets other forms of same-sex relationships.81

76

See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13,
at 28-31 (Oct. 11, 2000). The first attempts to pass legislation banning gay
marriage in Nebraska began in 1996 and were led by the Nebraska Family
Council (“NFC”). Id. at 28. The group’s efforts, including general
communication to legislators, a rally at the state Capitol and petition drives,
were inspired by the recent introduction of L.B. 1260, proposed legislation
that would have legalized same-sex marriage. Id. The NFC’s work did not
have any effect that year because it was too late in the session to introduce
new legislation. Id. The grass-roots foundation laid by these opponents of
same-sex marriage, however, would inspire others to push for similar
legislation a few years later. Id. at 28-30.
77
Id.
78
See Tom Shaw, Lawsuit Over 416 Readied, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Nov. 19, 2000 at 1B; John Fulwider, ACLU Hopes to Have 416 in Court by
January, NEB. ST. PAPER, November 19, 2000.
79
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
80
For an examination of opinions from other jurisdictions, see infra Part
II.C.
81
For an examination of the proposed drafts of Initiative 416, see infra
Part II.B.
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A. Relationships Covered by Initiative 416

Nebraska’s legislators clearly targeted civil unions created for
same-sex partners in Vermont. The chief proponent of Initiative
416 stated at a public hearing:
Nebraska will be the first state though to address
counterfeit or look-alike marriages if this amendment
passes. Since Vermont sanctioned civil unions during the
time that we were drafting this amendment, it would have
been remiss not to have a stated public policy regarding
backdoor attempts to define marriage by calling it another
name.82
Supporters also attempted to address the meaning of “domestic
partnership” and “other similar same-sex relationship” at these
public hearings.83 As supporter Guyla Mills stated at a public
hearing before Initiative 416 was passed:
Opponents of this initiative also state that this language is
ambiguous and vague. The terms civil unions and
domestic partnerships are terms that have been coined to
grant homosexual partner relationships.84
Unfortunately, statements like this do not clarify the law’s true
breadth, and reveal only that the drafters targeted more than just
marriage.
Initiative 416 may also implicate privately created benefits.
Hawaii’s gay marriage ban states, for example, that the law has
82

Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, at
31 (Oct. 11, 2000). Guyla Mills, a lobbyist for the Nonpartisan Family
Coalition, was one of the sponsors of the Nebraska amendment defining
marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Id. She also serves as
Chairperson of the Defense of Marriage Amendment Committee, which was
the group responsible for securing enough signatures to place this amendment
on the ballot.
83
Id. at 32. Domestic partnerships have commonly been understood to
mean either business relationships or cohabitation. Id. The proponents of this
amendment contend that sanctioning same-sex unions will inevitably result in
businesses being forced to provide state benefits because they too are domestic
partnerships. Id.
84
Id.
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no implications on private solemnization of marriage, while
Nebraska’s does not.85 Many businesses offer insurance benefits
and bereavement leave to employees with same-sex partners.86 To
obtain these benefits, an employee may have to sign a “domestic
partner affidavit” to establish that their partner is entitled to
health benefits.87 Initiative 416 could be used by insurance
companies to justify denying benefits to same-sex domestic
partners in Nebraska.
Domestic partnerships are also occasionally established at the
local or municipal level. For example, San Francisco and New
York have created registries through which city employees can
obtain health benefits for their partners.88 This may also be an
issue for other governmental entities, like the University of
Nebraska, which recently proposed to grant same-sex partner
benefits.89 Because the University is a government entity,
85

See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.6 (1999).
See More Companies Offering Same-Sex Partner Benefits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2000, at C2 (finding more companies than ever before are offering
health benefits to partners of gay and lesbian employees); Leigh Strope, More
Same-Sex Benefits Offered, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 2, 2001 (reporting that the
number of “Fortune 500” employers offering same-sex domestic partnership
benefits rose from 61 in 1998 to145 in 2001 and the larger and more
prominent the corporation is, the more likely it is to offer such benefits),
available at http://www.biz.yahoo.com/apf/011002/domestic_partners_1.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2002). See also Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Partial Summary of Domestic Partner Benefits Listings, available at
www.lambdalegal.org.
87
See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13,
at 69 (Oct. 12, 2000).
88
See Slattery v. City of New York, 686 N.Y.S. 2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1999)
(upholding New York City’s jurisdiction for domestic partnership benefits and
holding New York City domestic partnership law does not conflict with New
York State law or public policy); Associated Press, Domestic-Partner Law is
Upheld in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at 40; see also Katherine Q.
Seelye, Gay Policy in San Francisco Draws Penalty in House, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1998, at 18A (reporting that the San Francisco House of
Representatives narrowly passed a measure that would deny Federal housing
money to San Francisco because the city supports live-in homosexual
partners).
89
See Ray Parker, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Approves Health
86
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Initiative 416 could prohibit it from recognizing same-sex
relationships.
In addition to programs and laws that specifically provide
benefits to same-sex partners, some laws of general applicability
have been interpreted to protect same-sex partners in Nebraska.
For example the state law offering domestic violence protection
and restraining orders is used to protect same-sex partners.90 It is
as yet unclear whether a court order of protection pursuant to this
law would be deemed governmental recognition of a “similar
same sex relationship.” Judicial recognition and enforcement of
contracts entered into by same-sex partners could also be banned
under Initiative 416. Gay partners routinely create contracts to
establish some of the rights and obligations obtained
automatically upon marriage—416 could bar judicial enforcement
of these contracts.91
Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, at http://www.inform.umd.edu/EdRes/Topic/
Diversity/Specific/Sexual_Orientation/Issues/Benefits/unl.html (last modified
Apr. 18, 2000). The University of Nebraska proposed to grant same-sex
partners of faculty members the same health and insurance benefits that
spouses of heterosexual faculty members receive. Id.
90
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-928 (2000). The statute, titled “Protection
order; restraining order; violation; arrest,” reads:
A peace officer shall with or without a warrant arrest a person if (1)
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has
committed a violation of an order issued pursuant to section 42-924, a
violation of section 42-925, a violation of an order excluding a person
from certain premises issued pursuant to section 42-357, or a
violation of a valid foreign protection order recognized pursuant to
section 42-931 and (2) a petitioner under section 42-924 or 42-925,
an applicant for an order excluding a person from certain premises
issued pursuant to section 42-357, or a person protected under a valid
foreign protection order recognized pursuant to section 42-931
provides the peace officer with a copy of a protection order or an
order excluding a person from certain premises issued under such
sections or the peace officer determines that such an order exists after
communicating with the local law enforcement agency.
Id.
91
See JOHNETTE DUFF, SPOUSAL EQUIVALENT HANDBOOK (1992). This
book advises couples of ways to use comprehensive agreements and contracts
in lieu of a state-sanctioned marriage. See also Lambda Legal Defense and
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Education Fund, Life Planning: Legal Documents for Lesbians and Gay Men
(1998) [hereinafter Lambda Life Planning] (discussing documents gay and
lesbian couples are advised to draft in order to counter state legal
presumptions regarding property, health care, and family in the event of death
or disability), available at http://lambdalegal.org/sections/library/lifeplanning.
pdf. The handbook promotes documents including powers of attorney, wills,
living wills, revocable trusts, parenting agreements, living together
agreements and funeral arrangement agreements. Id. Wills and revocable
trusts are both tools that allow a deceased party to pass property upon death
and defeat state intestate succession laws that distribute property based on
familial ties. While a will must be recorded in a public office, a revocable
trust does not, making it a more attractive alternative to lesbian and gay
couples because it bypasses probate administration. Id. at 7, 19. Living
together agreements deal with the division of property during the partner’s
lifetime as opposed to after death. These agreements address financial
obligations regarding income and expenses, ownership of property and the
distribution of property in the event the relationship ends. Id. at 9. A power of
attorney authorizes a specified party to act on the principal’s behalf regarding
personal, medical, business, or financial decisions. Id. at 6, 14. The power of
attorney can be drafted to authorize such decisions for general activities, for
specific transactions and time periods, or only upon the principal’s incapacity.
Id. While living wills do not provide any benefits to partners, they do provide
instructions to health care providers regarding life support systems in the event
of a terminal illness or injury and an original copy of the document should be
provided to a trusted companion. Id. at 6, 16. Additionally, a health care
proxy allows the designation of a representative authorized to make health care
decisions when the principal is unable to do so. See also Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Advance Planning (Dec. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=935.
Parenting agreements allow partners to nominate a guardian who is not a
legally recognized parent of a child. Lambda Life Planning, supra, at 20.
Although the contract itself is not enforceable in court because courts must use
the best interest of the child standard in awarding custody of minor children,
the document can be used as evidence of a relationship in the court
proceeding. Id. at 7, 20.
While any legally competent adult can draft these documents, such
documents are always open to attack on the grounds of incompetence, undue
influence, fraud or duress. Id. at 3. Courts, however, have consistently held
such contracts enforceable absent any of the above grounds. See, e.g., Posik
v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1997) (finding that contracts between
unmarried adults are enforceable unless based on sexual services, thereby
validating a lesbian couple’s contract containing a provision requiring a
monthly living expense payments if the contract was breached); Crooke v.
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B. Proposed Drafts—Defining the Scope of 416

Read in sum, the various drafts and object clauses preceding
the language actually adopted for Initiative 416 clearly
demonstrate the intent to encompass more than marriage. One
un-adopted draft states, “Only a marriage between one man and
one woman shall be recognized in Nebraska.”92 Rejection of this
version indicates that supporters of the law deemed it inadequate
for their purposes.
The earlier drafts also suggest that the supporters’ true goal
was not simply to ban gay marriage, but to deny any other
method of conferring the rights and benefits of marriage upon
same-sex partners. One version states “[t]he unique status,
benefits, rights and protections of marriage as of January 1,
2000, shall be reserved solely to a man and a woman united in
marriage.”93 This version implies that insurance and inheritance
rights, for example, could not be conferred upon unmarried
same-sex partners.
Finally, the “object clause” of the version submitted to voters
fails to elucidate the intended scope.94 It states:
Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga.1992) (finding a contract addressing the division
of lesbian couple’s property was valid, reversing the lower court’s decision to
the contrary); Silver v. Starrett, 176 Misc. 2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998)
(finding that there was no duress in the execution of a separation agreement
granting property rights between a lesbian couple, and, therefore, the
agreement was enforceable).
If such contracts are now banned for gays, they remain a viable option for
heterosexuals. This raises equal protection issues that will be addressed in this
paper. See supra Part V.
92
See Nonpartisan Family Coalition, Draft Petitions to Add Language to
Nebraska Constitution (April 19, 2000; May 24, 2000) [hereinafter Draft
Petitions] (on file with author).
93
Draft Petitions (April 19, 2000), supra note 92, at 5.
94
Nebraska law requires that public initiative measures have an “object
clause.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1401 (2002). The law directs the public to
“print a concise statement in large type of the legal effect of the filing of the
petition and the object sought to be secured by submitting the measure to the
vote.” Id. (describing the form of petition required for initiating any law or
any amendment to Nebraska’s Constitution). See also Alan E. Peterson, Term
Limits: The Law Review Article, Not The Movie, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 767,
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The purpose of this proposed change in the Nebraska
Constitution is to define clearly marriage as a union
between one man and one woman, to provide that only
marriage between one man and one woman, whether
contracted in Nebraska or outside Nebraska, shall be
recognized in Nebraska, and to declare that same-sex civil
unions, domestic partnerships, or similar same-sex
relationships are not valid or recognized in Nebraska.95
Because this clause merely restates the petition language, it does
little to reveal the objective of the law. When read together with
various proposed drafts, however, the object clause strongly
suggests that the adopted version of 416 covers much more than
marriage.
C. Guidance from Other Jurisdictions to Determine the Scope
of Initiative 416
Nebraska’s courts have not addressed many of the definitional
issues regarding the terms employed in Initiative 416. In fact, the
only place in Nebraska law that currently includes any of these
terms is business law, which uses the term “domestic
partnership.”96 Others states and cities recognizing same-sex
partnerships have faced court challenges to define these terms.97
782, 783 (1998) (discussing the misleading nature of the object clause in the
Nebraska term limits initiative in that it failed to mention that the limits
applied to state legislators).
95
Draft Petitions (May 24, 2000), supra note 92.
96
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-451(2) (2000). Although the statute is part
of the Uniform Partnership Act governing the effect of a business partnership
merger, it explicitly refers to a domestic partnership. Id. In relevant part, the
statute reads, “The Secretary of State of this state is the agent for service of
process in an action or proceeding against a surviving foreign partnership or
limited partnership to enforce an obligation of a domestic partnership or
limited partnership that is a party to a merger.” Id.
97
See, e.g., Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, The State
Univ., 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (refusing to include domestic
partners in the definition of dependents for the purpose of health insurance
coverage); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1995)
(holding that the city did not have the power to grant health care benefits to
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For example, in Slattery v. City of New York, a taxpayer group
unsuccessfully challenged the City’s extension of health benefits
to domestic partners of municipal employees of both the same
and opposite sex.98 The plaintiffs argued that the City attempted
to define marriage, recognize a de-facto common law marriage,
acted in conflict with the state’s power to confer health benefits
and granted gay domestic partners marital status.99 The court
rejected these arguments, finding that benefits and municipal
registries did not constitute marriage.100 One important distinction
for the court was that “domestic partnerships” were created
without any of the formal requirements of marriage.101
The Supreme Court of Colorado reached a similar conclusion
in Schaefer v. City & County of Denver.102 There, a local law
domestic partners because such benefits were limited to “spouses” and
“dependants” in the state enabling statute and domestic partners do not fall
within either of those definitions).
98
686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
99
Id. at 685. Plaintiffs also alleged that the laws illegally recognized
common law marriages and that the City had exceeded statutory and
constitutional authority and attempted to give domestic partnerships a marital
status despite the absence of authority. Id.
100
Id. at 686. The court stated:
Requirements regulating marriages . . . are far more stringent than
those regulating domestic partnerships. . . . [A] marriage must be
solemnized by an authorized religious leader or an authorized leader
of the Society for Ethical Culture; the Mayor, city clerk or other
authorized local official; a New York State or a Federal Judge, or an
authorized judicial officer. Furthermore, although no particular form
of ceremony is required, the parties must solemnly declare in the
presence of the officiator that “they take each other as husband and
wife.”
Id. (citations omitted).
101
Id.
102
973 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1998). In Schaefer, residents challenged the
City’s authority to provide health benefits to spousal equivalents of public
employees. Id. The lower court allowed the City of Denver to extend the
definition of marriage, thereby allowing a city employee’s domestic partner to
enjoy the same health benefits as that of a city employee’s marriage partner.
Id. As in Slattery, the plaintiffs asserted that the City had acted illegally to
define marriage, an area reserved to the state. Id. at 719. See also supra note
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creating “spousal equivalents” for the purposes of extending
health care benefits was held not to be an illegal attempt to redefine marriage.103 The court stated that “[t]he ordinance
qualifies a separate and distinct group of people who are not
eligible to contract a state-sanctioned marriage to receive health
and dental insurance benefits from the City. Therefore, the
ordinance does not adversely impact the integrity and importance
of the institution of marriage.”104
Additionally, judicial invalidation of municipal provision of
health benefits for gay couples does not require that the provision
be construed as re-defining marriage.105 For example, in Lilly v.
City of Minneapolis the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that
only the State could determine who was entitled to government
health care benefits.106 Municipalities can extend benefits only as
99 and accompanying text (articulating the legal challenges presented in
Slattery).
103
Schaefer, 973 P.2d at 721.
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 152 F.3d 859, 862 (8th
Cir. 1998) (finding the municipality’s interpretation of a statute to benefit
same-sex domestic partners as usurping the legislature’s intent in crafting the
law); City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517, 521 (Ga. 1995)
(concluding that the city exceeded its power to provide benefits to employees
and their dependents by recognizing domestic partners as “a family
relationship” and providing employee benefits to them “in a comparable
manner . . . as for a spouse”); Devlin v. City of Phila., 809 A.2d 980, 993
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (holding that inclusion of two unmarried, unrelated
people who live together as life partners did not fall within the statutory
guidelines enumerating the class for tax benefits).
106
527 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1995). The City of Minneapolis passed
a resolution providing reimbursement to city employees for health care
insurance costs for same-sex domestic partners. Id. at 108. The resolution also
permitted health insurance reimbursement for certain classes of blood
relatives. Id. The ordinance attempted to “provide employee health care
benefits to persons not defined as ‘spouse’ or ‘dependents’ in a general state
statute concerning the grant of health care benefits to municipal employees.”
Id. at 109. The plaintiff in Lilly was a resident of Minneapolis who sought to
enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance. Id. The court noted that
Minneapolis was a “home rule” charter city, which meant that the city could
legislate as to “matters of a purely local nature.” Id. at 113. Since conferring
health insurance is a statewide matter, the court found that Minneapolis’
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permitted by the state.107 Accordingly, the City of Minneapolis’
attempt to grant benefits to city employees’ “domestic partners”
was illegal on this basis, not because the law constituted local
recognition of gay marriage.108
These decisions are significant because, when supporters of
Initiative 416 speak of “domestic partnerships” and “same-sex
relationships,” they refer to relationships that courts have defined
as not meaning marriage. This includes state-sanctioned civilunions,109 contracts creating domestic partnerships,110 as well as
informal partnerships created when health benefits are offered to
same-sex partners.111 Initiative 416 has potential implications for
gay couples in myriad contexts, therefore, including denial of
recognition of non-marriage partnerships, contracts, health
benefits, municipally created registries and requests for
protection from domestic violence.
III. INITIATIVE 416 AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Nebraska’s Initiative 416 does more than deny same-sex
partners the right to have extra-jurisdictionally created civil
actions were ultra vires and “without legal force or effect.” Id.
107
Id. at 111.
108
Id. at 108.
109
See Sarah Schweitzer, Civil Unions in VT: Easier to Enter Than Exit,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15, 2002, at A1 (noting that civil unions are marriages
in all but name).
110
Contracts between non-marital partners are routinely enforced. See,
e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that express
contracts between non-marital co-habitants may be enforced and in the absence
of an express contract, the court may find a contract implied in law); Salzman
v. Bachrach, 999 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 2000) (holding that agreement between
non-marital cohabitants did not violate public policy); Boland v. Catalano, 521
A.2d 142 (Conn. 1987) (holding that the existence of a sexual relationship
between the parties did not preclude the existence of an express agreement
between a non-marital couple).
111
See Schaefer v. City & County of Denver, 973 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1998)
(holding that a city ordinance granting health care benefits to spousal
equivalents was matter of local concern that was not preempted by state
statute).
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unions and reciprocal beneficiary status recognized in the state. It
also denies gays the right to petition Nebraska’s legislature for
the creation or recognition of non-marriage relationships like
civil unions, domestic partnerships,112 registries113 and perhaps
even partner health benefits, by foreclosing legal recognition of
virtually any domestic arrangement or agreement between samesex couples.114 This sweeping, extraordinary limitation presents
distinct questions as to whether the amendment violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.115

112

See Slattery v. City of New York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683, 683 (Sup. Ct.
1999) (discussing a New York City law that recognizes certain rights of a
domestic partnership, while emphasizing the difference between a domestic
partnership and a marriage).
113
While these types of unions are not widely available for heterosexual
or homosexual couples in the United States, they do exist for gays in several
European countries. France has created an unmarried partners registry that is
like a contract for same-sex and opposite-sex couples. See Suzanne Daley,
France Gives Legal Status to Unmarried Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999,
at A3 (discussing a law passed by the French Parliament that gives legal status
to unmarried couples as well as homosexual couples allowing them the same
rights as married couples with respect to tax advantages, inheritances,
housing, and social welfare). Despite passage of the French law, activists
protested the law, stating that it gave homosexual unions a lower status than
marriage. Id. Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have also
created civil unions for gay couples, followed by the Netherlands, which has
recently permitted same-sex partners to marry. See Reuters, Same Sex Dutch
Couples Gain Marriage and Adoption Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at
A8. (discussing a new law passed in the Netherlands that affords same-sex
couples the same rights as heterosexual couples to marry and adopt children
and acknowledging similar laws in other European countries). The
Netherlands is the first nation to offer gays the right to marry. Id.
114
As noted, the second sentence of Nebraska’s Initiative 416 was
broadly drafted and declares that a “civil union, domestic partnership or other
similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.”
See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
115
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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A. Protection of Gays, As a Class, Under the Fourteenth
Amendment

Initiative 416 implicates the Fourteenth Amendment because
non-married heterosexuals can petition the state legislature to
confer legal rights to opposite-sex partners, while homosexuals
cannot.116 Additionally, depending upon the scope of the law in
application, Initiative 416 may deny homosexuals the right to
petition for domestic partner benefits programs and registries at
the state or municipal level.117 Finally, if Initiative 416 does
implicate contractual relationships, gay cohabitation contracts that
create domestic partnerships would be unenforceable in courts,
while unmarried heterosexual couples would retain this
alternative to marriage.118
Homosexuals are a cognizable group under the Equal
Protection Clause, which bars any state from denying “to any

116

The inclusion of “same-sex” in the text of Nebraska’s amendment
explicitly treats individuals involved in same-sex relationships differently than
those in opposite-sex relationships. This unequal treatment conflicts with the
principles of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution as it
has been construed and applied by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-35 (1996). The Romer Court stated that
“[c]entral both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its
parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” Id. at
633. The Court further added, “‘Equal protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.’” Id.
117
For an explanation as to whether Initiative 416 could prevent
recognition of same-sex contracts and relationships in the context of
municipal, local or even employment level, see supra Part IV.C (discussing
cases from other jurisdictions in which local and municipal laws governing
same-sex relationships were struck down on the basis that the laws usurped the
State’s power to define marriage and marital relations).
118
As noted, the second sentence of Initiative 416 explicitly bans
recognition of non-marital unions or contracts only in the context of same-sex
relationships, allowing opposite-sex non-marital unions or contracts to be
cognizable by courts or the legislature. See supra Part III (discussing the scope
of Initiative 416 and the legislative intent to reach all permutations of
homosexual unions).
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”119
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Romer
v. Evans, and found that laws based on sexual orientation are not
subjected to strict scrutiny.120 Rather, the applicable standard in
this context is “if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class . . . the legislative classification [will be
upheld] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end.”121 In Romer, the Court reviewed a Colorado constitutional
amendment that barred government protection for sexual
orientation based discrimination.122 Several municipalities in the
state had passed laws attempting to do just that—make
discrimination based on sexual orientation illegal.123 The Supreme
Court determined that the Colorado law violated the Equal
Protection Clause because gays as a class were barred from
119

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer the court struck down an amendment
to Colorado’s Constitution that precluded all legislative, executive or judicial
action designed to protect the status of persons based on their homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships. Id. The
level of scrutiny eventually agreed upon by the Colorado Supreme Court was
strict scrutiny, which was not satisfied and the enforcement of the amendment
was enjoined. Id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed but did not apply
strict scrutiny and struck down the law on the basis that it seemed
“inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.” Id. at 632. See also Gay
Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 367 F.Supp. 1088 (D.N.H. 1974).
Bonner was a civil rights action arising out of the denial by University of New
Hampshire officials of the right of the Gay Students Organization, a
homosexual organization to hold “social functions” on the campus. Id. at
1901. The organization claimed that the denial violated its First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and requested that the court declare its rights to
organize and function on the University campus. Id. The New Hampshire
District Court found that gays students could not be treated dissimilarly from
other students, rejecting morality as a sound basis for such discrimination, and
held that once the University granted a particular privilege of holding social
functions to other campus organizations, the Fourteenth Amendment required
that the privilege be available to all organizations on an equal basis. Id. at
1097.
121
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
122
Id. at 629.
123
Id.
120
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seeking official state protection.124 Although this right remained
available for all other groups, the Court acknowledged that under
the challenged legislation “[h]omosexuals [were] forbidden the
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”125
Similarly, heterosexual couples in Nebraska may petition the
government for recognition of non-marriage relationships, while
homosexuals are effectively barred from doing so. Diluting a
group’s political or voting power based on a characteristic that
has no relation to a legitimate state interest is unconstitutional.126
Under Initiative 416, a distinct group of politically unpopular
persons is burdened and barred from petitioning elected officials
for civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other same-sex
relationships as a means of obtaining the rights associated with
marriage.127
Legislation that targets a group of politically unpopular
persons and denies governmental protection or voting power to
124

Id. at 635. The court stated, “A State cannot so deem a class of
persons a stranger to its laws. [The Colorado Amendment] violates the Equal
Protection Clause.” Id.
125
Id. at 631. See also Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Riverside
City Council, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting a legislative
proposal that would deny gays the ability to petition their local council for
laws barring discrimination).
126
See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 4 (1971). In Gordon, the Supreme
Court found that requiring sixty percent approval by the municipality’s voters
for bond indebtedness gave a minority of the population greater voting power
than the majority. Id. at 6. Despite this finding, the Court held that in this case
the voting requirement did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because
there is nothing in the language of the constitution requiring that a majority
always prevail on every issue. Id.
127
See Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“[I]f the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (citing Dep’t of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))); see also Equal. Found. of Greater
Cincinnati. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 299 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing
Romer’s description of homosexuals as a “politically unpopular minority”);
Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1436 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing discrimination against gay military service
members as “discrimination against an unpopular class”).
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obtain such protection is also plainly unconstitutional. For
example in Hunter v. Erickson the Supreme Court refused to
permit Akron, Ohio to deny racial minorities the right to petition
for protection against housing discrimination.128 The municipal
ordinance at issue denied protections in housing, leasing or
renting based on race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry
without a voter referendum.129 Protective measures for other
groups, like those based on gender, political affiliation or pet
ownership, could merely be enacted by the city council.130 The
Supreme Court articulated, “[T]he State may no more
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote
or give any group a smaller representation than another of
comparable size.”131 Accordingly, the ordinance was deemed to
discriminate against minorities and “constitute[d] a real,
substantial, and invidious denial of the equal protection of the
laws.”132
Initiative 416 has an effect similar to the ordinance at issue in
Hunter, inasmuch as protective measures, like domestic
partnership status, offer considerable life security to couples.133
128

393 U.S. 385 (1969). Minority citizens sought a writ of mandamus
against city officials to prevent them from implementing an Akron city
ordinance providing that a majority of city voters had to approve any
amendment to the city charter that would allow the city council to pass an
ordinance regulating the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing, lease,
sublease, or financing of real estate on basis of race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry. Id. The United Court Supreme Court reversed the Ohio
Supreme Court and found that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id.
129
Id. at 387.
130
Id. at 390-91.
131
Id. at 393.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 387. See, e.g., Women’s Institute for Leadership Development
for Human Rights, All Our Families Deserve Human Rights (2000) (discussing
the protective benefits deprived by legislation denying domestic partnership,
such as hospital visitation rights, shared health insurance coverage and
property
inheritance
and
ownership
rights),
available
at
http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/all_families.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2003).
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These are now nearly impossible for gays to obtain.
Heterosexuals can petition their representatives for a host of
rights and protections, although gays cannot. Additionally, as
noted in Hunter, passage by voter referendum does not immunize
a law from the Equal Protection Clause.134 Initiative 416 could be
found unconstitutional based upon the rationale of Hunter
because it does not bar creation of marriage alternatives or
benefit programs for all unmarried persons.
The mere fact that a suspect class is not targeted in Nebraska
does not mean that the rational basis test will be passed.135
Politically unpopular groups, whether a suspect class or not,
cannot be targeted by laws that bear no relation to a legitimate
state interest.136 The burden Initiative 416 places on gays
134

See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392 (noting that “[c]haracterizing [the
ordinance] simply as a public decision to move slowly in the delicate area of
race relations emphasizes the impact and burden . . . but does not justify it”).
135
Supreme Court precedent establishes that the rational basis test applies
in the context of challenges to laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation because homosexuals are not a suspect class. See, e.g., Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641-43 (1996) (stating that rational basis, the normal
test for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, is the governing
standard and affirming the Supreme Court of Colorado’s decision that
homosexuality is not a distinct class); see also Equal. Found. of Greater
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that it is virtually impossible to distinguish or separate individuals of a
particular orientation according to a particular sexual conduct); Beller v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808-09 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
military discharge for engaging in homosexual acts would be rational under
minimal scrutiny because the general military policy of discharging all
homosexuals is rational).
136
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532 (1973). In
this case, several groups brought a class action lawsuit against the Department
of Agriculture, its Secretary and other departmental officials seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief against the implementation of section 3(e) of
the Food Stamp Act. Id. Each one of the groups was deemed ineligible to
participate in the Food Stamp Program because they had one or more
unrelated individuals living in their households. Id. at 531. For example, one
member of the class, Jacinta Moreno, lived with Ermina Sanchez and Ms.
Sanchez’s three children. Id. Ms. Sanchez cared for Ms. Moreno, a diabetic,
and they shared common living expenses. Id. Although without Ms. Moreno’s
residence in the household, Ms. Sanchez and her children would be eligible
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resembles the issue presented to the Supreme Court in United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.137 Moreno was a
class action challenge to an amendment to the Federal Food
Stamp Act that rendered ineligible for federal assistance any
household containing an individual unrelated by blood or
marriage to any other household member.138 The Court found that
the law was created to deny federal assistance to people regarded
as “hippies,” but the government’s expressed goal to eliminate
fraudulent claims for federal assistance bore no rational relation
to whether needy persons sharing a household were related.139
Ultimately, the Court stated, “[B]are congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”140 Similarly, Initiative 416 is narrowly
drafted, targeting unmarried gay couples, but lacks any
determination that unmarried gay couples pose a greater threat to
society than unmarried heterosexual couples.
B. Initiative 416 Lacks a Rational Relationship to a
Legitimate State Interest
Because gays as a class are afforded some protection under
the Equal Protection Clause, evaluation of the constitutionality of
the law requires application of the rational basis test.141 No
for $108 worth of food stamps per month, the fact that Ms. Moreno lived in
the same household with them rendered them all ineligible for assistance. Id.
at 531-32. The Supreme Court held that the “unrelated person” provision was
an irrational classification and was invalid under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 533.
137
Id. at 529.
138
Id. The statute at issue was the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §
2012(e) (1964), amended by 84 Stat. 2048 (1971).
139
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-35.
140
Id. at 534.
141
See supra note 135 (discussing application of the rational basis test in
the context of classification based on sexual orientation); see also Equal.
Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.
1997) (finding classification on the basis of sexual orientation in a city
ordinance subject to the rational basis test); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s decision not
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rational basis is discernable on the face of the law, nor from the
three hearings that were conducted to do exactly that—provide a
record of the proponents’ goals in enacting the law.142
The Supreme Court set forth the analytical framework for
determining whether a law has a rational relation to a legitimate
state interest in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center.143 The Texas law at issue in Cleburne required a special
use permit for group homes for the mentally retarded.144 Laws
concerning mentally retarded persons are subject to the rational
basis test.145 The Court, however, found the zoning law’s
“relationship to an asserted goal so attenuated as to render the
distinction arbitrary and irrational.”146 Apartment buildings,
hospitals, sanitariums, dormitories, nursing homes and private
to hire a female homosexual applicant subject to the rational basis test under
the Equal Protection Clause); Scott Patrick Johnson, An Analysis of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Decision Making in Gay Rights Cases (1985-2000), 27 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 197 (2001) (discussing the future of homosexual rights in light
of the Supreme Court’s application of the Equal Protection Clause to sexual
orientation in Romer); Kyle C. Velte, Paths to Protection: A Comparison of
Federal Protection Based on Disability and Sexual Orientation, 6 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 323, 351-54 (2000) (discussing cases where the Equal
Protection Clause was applied to classifications based on sexual orientation).
142
See supra Parts I.C, II.A (discussing the intent of Nebraska’s
legislators in passing Initiative 416); see also supra Part II.B (setting forth the
various proposed drafts to Initiative 416 and determining the breadth of the
amendment’s language).
143
473 U.S. 432 (1985). The “rational basis” test has also been applied,
for example, to state laws that discriminate on the basis of property ownership
and when a state prevents aliens from holding local jobs that mimic
government functions. See, e.g., Quinn v. Millsap 491 U.S. 95, 106-07
(1989) (using the rational basis test to invalidate a Missouri law that required
an individual to own real property in the state to be appointed to a government
board). But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a New
York law that required public school teachers to be United States citizens as
rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
144
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436. Specifically, the statute required that a
special use permit would be required “for the construction of ‘[h]ospitals for
the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or
correctional institutions.’” Id. at 436-37.
145
Id. at 442.
146
Id. at 446.
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clubs, among other types of uses, did not require special use
permits.147 The distinction between many of these uses and group
homes was particularly elusive, and the Court found that the City
Council was apparently trying to assuage residents’ prejudice
against and fears of the mentally retarded, without any supporting
evidence that a group home posed a special threat to the
community.148 The Court specifically noted the irrationality of
barring group homes but permitting facilities of similar
densities.149 Rather than being based on the legitimate
government purposes of safety and community stability, “this
case appear[ed] . . . to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded . . . . “150
One example of a law that constitutionally and rationally
distinguished between two classes of individuals was addressed in
Heller v. Doe.151 There, the Court upheld a law that distinguished
between the “mentally retarded” and the “mentally ill,”152 Where
the State of Kentucky had different standards for the involuntary
commitment of the two groups.153 Specifically, the mentally
147

For example, homes for drug addicts and the insane did require special
use permits. Id. at 447.
148
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. The other factors included the location of
the home near a school, or within a flood plain. Neither of these concerns was
unique to the group home, which had been singled out as requiring a permit.
Id. at 449.
149
Id. at 449. The Court noted:
If there is no concern about legal responsibility with respect to other
uses that would be permitted in the area, such as boarding and
fraternity houses, it is difficult to believe that the groups of mildly or
moderately mentally retarded individuals who would live at 201
Featherston would present any different or special hazard.
Id.
150
Id. at 450.
151
509 U.S. 312 (1993).
152
Id. at 315.
153
Id. The court noted:
[A]t a final commitment hearing, the applicable burden of proof for
involuntary commitment based on mental retardation is clear and
convincing evidence, while the standard for involuntary commitment
based on mental illness is beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [I]n
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retarded could be committed when their incapacity was
established by clear and convincing evidence, while the mentally
ill had to be proven incapacitated at a higher standard, beyond a
reasonable doubt.154 This distinction was deemed appropriate
because mental retardation was usually diagnosed at an earlier
age and with greater certainty than mental illness.155 Thus the
distinction bore a rational relation to a legitimate state interest—
preventing
inappropriate
involuntary
confinement.156
Heterosexual and homosexual unmarried persons, however, are
not distinguishable in the same manner as the groups in Heller,
and Initiative 416 appears to be grounded, absent any other stated
purpose, solely in prejudice against gays.
1. Religious Beliefs and Prejudicial Animus
One common basis propounded at the hearings for Initiative
416 was religion, an illegitimate basis for state laws.157
commitment hearings for mental retardation, unlike for mental
illness, ‘guardians and immediate family members’ of the subject of
the proceeding ‘may participate . . . as if a party to the proceedings,’
with all attendant rights, including the right to present evidence and to
appeal.
Id. (citations omitted).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 321.
156
Id. at 328.
157
The Nebraska statute, according to many of its supporters, is an effort
to codify a Christian perspective on homosexual partnerships. See, e.g.,
Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, at 100
(Oct. 12, 2000) (“The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all
the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their
wickedness.”).
The Constitution expressly forbids the establishment of any state religion.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The test generally applied to such laws examines
“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See also Bd. of
Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (declaring that a state statute
delegating authority over public schools to a religious group as

RIZZOMACRO 3-14.DOC

4/1/03 2:52 PM

NEBRASKA’S INITIATIVE 416

43

Supporters of the amendment repeatedly referred to the biblical
story of Adam and Eve.158 There were also references to the
“Judeo-Christian” foundation of the United States.159 For
example, one commentator noted, “Nebraska was settled by men
and women of Christian faith who worked hard to produce their
freedom to worship their God in the Church of their choice. The
foundation of our ancestors’ faith was the Bible, the inspired
word of God.”160
In Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that anti-miscegenation laws could be
constitutionally based in religious beliefs.161 There, the trial
judge, whose decision was later overturned by the Court, invoked
the intent of “almighty God” to keep the races separate.162 This
justification plainly did not pass constitutional muster.163
unconstitutional).
158
See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13,
at 49 (Oct. 11, 2000), 84 (Oct. 12, 2000), 96 (Oct. 12, 2000).
159
See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13,
at 64 (Oct. 11, 2000) (“It will be determined if we continue to use the JudeoChristian mind-set of the founding fathers that established the greatest nation
ever, or if we will abandon what works and begin changing to a pagan mindset that has demonstrated self-destructive repercussions for those using it”).
160
See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13,
at 96 (Oct. 12, 2000). Mark Bonkiewicz, a businessman residing in southwest
Omaha, made this statement.
161
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring that Virginia’s statute banning interracial
marriage was an unconstitutional racial classification, in violation of the
constitutional liberty to marry under due process of law).
162
Id. at 3. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion quotes the trial judge as
stating:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red,
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not
intend for the races to mix.
Id.
163
Id. at 12 (holding that statutes prohibiting interracial marriage
deprived plaintiffs of “liberty without due process of law in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Id. The Court proceeded
to say that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
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Religious beliefs can certainly offer no more of a sound a basis
for laws expressing intolerance for homosexuals than for those
founded in racial intolerance.164
Neither can animus and intolerance of same-sex relationships
be a constitutionally permissible basis for Initiative 416. As the
Supreme Court noted in Palmore v. Sidoti, “[t]he Constitution
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”165 In Palmore,
parents were litigating the custody of their daughter.166 The father
sought to modify a prior judgment granting custody to the
mother, due to “changed conditions”—the mother’s relationship
with a black man.167 The father proposed that a child growing up
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
Id.
164
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackman J.,
dissenting).
That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the
behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments
on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends
instead on whether the State can advance some justification for its law
beyond its conformity to religious doctrine.
Id. A thorough analysis of attempts to invoke religion to validate legislative
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation is beyond the scope of this
article, although this has been thoughtfully explored elsewhere. See generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public
Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997) (drawing comparisons between sexual
orientation and religion as “identity characteristic[s] that [are] both physically
invisible and morally polarizing”); John V. Harrison, Peeping Through the
Closet Keyhole: Sodomy, Homosexuality, and the Amorphous Right of Privacy,
74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1087 (2000) (concluding that, despite the nation’s
efforts to protect sexual liberties, many individuals are still considered
criminals “because of the way they privately express the most basic of human
instincts”).
165
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
166
Id. 430-31.
167
Id. at 430. The Court articulated the father’s challenge as stating that
“the child’s mother was then cohabiting with a Negro . . . whom she married
two months later. Additionally, the father made several allegations of instances
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in a racially mixed household would potentially face community
scorn.168 The Florida state courts found credence in this
argument, though the Supreme Court soundly rejected it.169
Similarly, in order to uphold Initiative 416, the courts would
have to come to the improbable conclusion that religious or
societal intolerance are legitimate bases for unequal treatment of
homosexuals, but are not adequate bases for unequal treatment of
the races.170
in which the mother had not properly cared for the child.” Id.
168
Id. at 430. Specifically, the father presented recommendations from
the court counselor in an earlier case describing the social consequences of an
interracial marriage. Id. The lower court accepted the recommendation for a
change in custody because the wife had “chosen for herself and for her child,
a life-style unacceptable to the father and to society . . . . The child . . . is, or
at school age will be subject to environmental pressures not of choice.” Id.
169
See id. at 431. The Court noted:
The effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial
classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother. The Constitution cannot control such prejudice, but neither
can it tolerate it. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.
Id.
170
This conclusion has been noted in other judicial opinions ruling on the
constitutionality of sexual orientation based legislative classifications. See,
e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (noting that
sexual orientation appears to possess most or all of the characteristics that have
persuaded the Supreme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional
scrutiny to legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause); High
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (noting that a Department of Defense policy reflected irrational
prejudice and outmoded stereotypes and notions about homosexuals); see also
Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened
Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797
(1984); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality
as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
Another commentator has noted that legislative bans on same-sex
marriages ought to be declared unconstitutional on the same basis that the
Supreme Court invalidated racially discriminatory marriage statutes. See
MERIN, supra note 7, at 236. Specifically, Merin states:
Full recognition of same-sex marriages in the United States will be
possible only if and when the U.S. Supreme Court decides that both
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2. Preservation of Marriage

Another basis put forth for Initiative 416 is that it protects
and stabilizes the institution of marriage in Nebraska.171 There is
no evidence, however, that barring gays access to their
legislators enhances the stability of marriage.172 While protecting
state and federal DOMAs are unconstitutional and that states cannot
constitutionally invoke a public policy exception to refuse recognition
of out-of-state same-sex marriages, as it did in the case of antimiscegenation laws more than thirty years ago.
Id.
171

See Family First, Capitol Watch, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2002) (supporting
Initiative 416 because it would reinforce the traditional understanding of
marriage instead of weakening and destroying it by introducing other forms of
marriage), available at http://www.familyfirst.org/capitolwatch/1000.pdf. See
also Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on Most Sweeping Ban on Gay Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at 9 (quoting former Governor Bob Nelson
saying Initiative 416 “makes a statement for traditional marriage” and that a
homosexual union “was not a moral relationship”); Stephen Buttry & Leslie
Reed, Voters OK Same Sex Union Ban, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 8,
2000, at 1 (quoting Bill Ramsey, Co-Chairman of the Nebraska Coalition for
the Protection of Marriage, hailing the passage of Initiative 416 as a vital
message saying, “Marriage as we know it, respect it and love it has been
preserved”).
172
See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Get the Facts:
Talking About the Freedom to Marry: Why Same-Sex Couples Should Have
Equality in Marriage (June 20, 2001) (arguing that allowing same-sex couples
to marry promotes stability in the community in the same way opposite sex
marriage does) at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/
record?record=47. The article argues:
Same-sex couples build their lives together like other couples,
working hard at their jobs, volunteering in their neighborhoods, and
valuing the responsibilities and love that their family commitments
provide to them and to the children they may have. These families
have everyday concerns, like being financially sound, emotionally
and physically healthy, and protected by adequate health insurance.
These concerns heighten when there are children in the family.
Marriage provides tangible protections that address many of these
concerns. Promotion of support and security for families is a benefit
to the entire community; it does not de-stabilize other families. Equal
access to marriage will also emphasize equality and nondiscrimination for all of society.
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families and marriages is indisputably a legitimate state interest,
the amendment bears no rational relation to this end.173
Initiative 416 was enacted to protect marriage, undoubtedly a
legitimate state interest. Yet the distinction made between
unmarried homosexuals and heterosexuals undermines the
assertion that the law is related to the protection of traditional
marriage.174 The law is under-inclusive inasmuch as is does not
Id.
173

State legislatures are permitted to regulate issues of domestic law, and
state courts are granted jurisdiction to determine issues of application and
interpretation of these issues. See supra note 11 (discussing the reservation of
issues of domestic law to the states). Because Initiative 416 limits the rights of
homosexuals in the State and establishes a legislative distinction between
heterosexual relationships and homosexual relationships, the amendment will
merit rational basis scrutiny for examination as to whether the distinction is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See supra Part III.A
(discussing the application of the rational basis test to legislative classifications
based on sexual orientation).
174
Proponents of anti-miscegenation laws in Loving noted that the laws
applied equally to blacks and whites as an attempt to characterize the laws as
equitable. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). Initiative 416,
however, cannot be similarly defended, because gays and heterosexuals are
treated dissimilarly.
Additionally, legislation protecting “traditional” family structures has
occasionally been rejected by courts on the basis that there is no single
established definition of the makeup of a “traditional” family. See, e.g.,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (refusing to
establish a bright line definition of family by “cutting off any protection of
family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary—the boundary of
the nuclear family”); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44
(1977) (noting the difficulty of defining family for Due Process purposes and
considering factors other courts have considered in making such a
determination); see, Alber v. Ill. Dep’t of Mental Health & Developmental
Disabilities, 786 F.Supp. 1340, 1367 n.25 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In Alber, the
court noted:
[T]he Supreme Court has specified that neither the traditional
“boundary of the nuclear family” nor the existence of blood
relationships nor the legitimacy of a family arrangement under state
law defines the boundaries of family rights. Lower courts are thus
free, within the limits marked out by the Court, to determine that a
particular non-nuclear or non- biological family merits constitutional
protection.
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ban non-marriage relationships between heterosexuals, belying
the proponents’ political animus towards homosexuals.175 This
sort of political animus rendered the Colorado law at issue in
Romer v. Evans a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.176
Moreover, Nebraska’s courts have already upheld
cohabitation agreements between unmarried heterosexual
couples.177 The Supreme Court of Nebraska considered a
cohabitation agreement in Kinkenon v. Hue and stated that “[t]he
record shows that sexual services did not form the basis for the
agreement between the parties. For that reason, this agreement
does not violate public policy.”178 Implicit in this decision is that
contracts of cohabitation outside of marriage are not void or
against the state’s public policy, at least when created between
heterosexual partners.
The distinction between gay and heterosexual unmarried
couples is also undermined by decisions from other jurisdictions.
For example, in Baehr v. Miike, the Hawaii court determined,
after extensive hearings, that there were no negative implications
for children raised by same-sex parents.179 Additionally, the
Id.
175

As noted, Initiative 416 bans only “same-sex relationships” but does
not apply to similar arrangements between opposite sex couples. See NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 29.
176
517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
177
See Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77 (Neb. 1981) (holding that
parties entered into an oral contract whereby the appellant was to perform
certain services, including housework, for the appellant in exchange for a
home to live in for the rest of her life and that this contract was specifically
enforceable). See also Wolf v. Mangiamele, No. A-97-284, 1998 WL 902572
(Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1998) (noting that agreements between parties
engaged in non-marital, but presumptively sexual, relationships, are valid and
enforceable as long as sexual services do not form the basis of the agreement).
178
Kinkenon, 301 N.W.2d at 80.
179
1996 WL 694235, at *5 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The Hawaii
court found that there was insufficient evidence to establish or prove any
adverse consequences resulting from same-sex marriage. Id. In its hearings,
the court found that although a father and a mother provide a child with unique
paternal and maternal contributions important to the development of a happy,
healthy and well-adjusted child, such contributions are not essential. Id. The
evidence presented established that the most important factor in the
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Supreme Court of Vermont found that denying the benefits and
protections of marriage to children of same-sex households posed
a greater risk to families.180 Other courts have arrived at similar
conclusions in the context of parental custody and adoption
rights.181 Thus, Initiative 416 not only runs afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it also destroys the very interests it
seeks to protect—family stability and marriage.
IV. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND INITIATIVE 416
The second sentence of Initiative 416 also violates the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.182 The
Clause requires that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
development of a happy, healthy and well-adjusted child is the nurturing
relationship between parent and child. Id. The sexual orientation of parents is
not, alone, an indicator of parental fitness and does not automatically
disqualify them from being good, fit, loving or successful parents. Id.
180
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999); see also Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (listing the numerous protections
afforded families in marriage including child support rights).
181
See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (holding that a
biological mother’s same-sex former domestic partner had standing to seek
joint legal custody of, and visitation with, mother’s biological children); In re
Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002) (holding that unmarried samesex partners could adopt a child without the legal parent relinquishing his or
her parental rights); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (finding
that same-sex couples may have recourse in the courts in the event that a
custody dispute results from the breakup of relationship); In re B.L.V.B., 628
A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (holding that an unmarried same-sex partner
could adopt her partner’s biological child); see also Susan Becker, ReOrienting Law and Sexuality: Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in
Ohio: Unsettled and Unsettling Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101 (2000);
Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L.
REV. 341 (2002); Linda Whobrey Rohman et al., The Best Interests of the
Child in Custody Disputes, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS 59 (L.A. Weithorn ed., 1987).
182
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effects thereof.”183 Since no
state currently allows same-sex marriage, the first sentence of
Nebraska’s amendment has no immediate implications.184
Additionally, the so-called “public policy exemption” to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause may permit states to decline recognition
of marriages that violate the state’s public policy.185 The federal
183

Id.
As noted, the first sentence of Initiative 416 bans only same-sex
marriage, and other states have passed similar laws. See supra notes 1, 3
(discussing the text of Initiative 416 and noting that similar laws have been
passed in other states). Moreover, the force of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has been questioned in the context of recognition of out-of-state
marriages. See, e.g., MERIN, supra note 7, at 231 (noting that “it is debatable
whether the U.S. Constitution will compel such recognition, because the Full
Faith and Credit Clause has not commonly been relied upon by courts in
determining whether they should recognize out-of-state marriages (e.g.,
common law marriages) that could not have been performed within the
jurisdiction”).
185
See, e.g., Matlock v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 166 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1998).
In Matlock, the plaintiff filed an application for disabled widow’s insurance
benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act, on account of a deceased wage
earner. Id. In denying the application, the court stated the general rule that
“[a] marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.” Id.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1996)
(examining the “public policy” exception in the context of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause).
There is debate as to whether, in the event one state recognizes the right
of same-sex couples to marry, other states can avoid recognition of such
marriages on the basis of this public policy exception. See MERIN, supra note
7, at 232. Specifically, MERIN notes:
Notwithstanding the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in situations
involving marriage validity, and according to traditional choice-oflaw rules, courts have generally followed the rule of lex celebratonis,
which states that a marriage valid where entered into should be
recognized as valid everywhere, and the tendency in American
conflicts cases is to validate marriages entered into in other
jurisdictions, unless the legislature has rejected the rule of validity or
the marriage is so abominable that validating it would offend the
184
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DOMA reinforced this exception.186 There is, however, no basis
public policy sense of morality.
Id. Accordingly, and because “each state has its own conflicts doctrine, many
states look to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (1996) for
direction.” Id. Other commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g.,
Sylvia Law, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Families
and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 217 (2000) (“Several states,
such as California, adopted rules stating that any marriage valid in the place
contracted is valid in their state. Other states take a more restrictive approach
and refuse to recognize marriages that violate a strong public policy of the
state.”); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act and the
Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1439
(1997) (observing that while the general rule is lex celebrationis, some states
employ an exception to the rule “if honoring a sister state’s marriage would
violate an important public policy of the enforcing state”); Note, In Sickness
and in Health, in Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflicts of Laws and Recognition
of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2038, 2043 (1996) (“Although
each state has its own conflicts doctrine, many states look to the Restatement
for direction.”).
186
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 7 (1996) (finding that the purpose of
the legislation is to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage
and to protect the rights of the tates to formulate their own public policy
regarding the legal recognition of same-sex marriages). It should be noted,
however, DOMA does not require that states recognize same-sex unions.
Other commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., MERIN
supra note 7, at 228-29. Merin notes that “[a]lthough a provision in DOMA
allows states not to recognize same-sex marriages performed in another state,
the act does not mandate that states disregard such marriages.” Id. He further
states that, “each state needs to determine individually whether to take
advantage of the act’s exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 229; see also Leonard G. Brown III,
Constitutionally Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v.
Evans and the Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 159,
169 (1996) (stating that section 2 of DOMA uses the words, “No State . . .
shall be required,” which clearly shows that Congress did not intend to require
a state to do anything; they are merely recognizing an already existing state
right to disregard an act, judgment or decree when it violates a state’s
legitimate public policy); Diane M. Gillerman, The Defense of Marriage Act:
The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage,
34 HOUS. L. REV. 425, 463 (1997) (making the argument that DOMA does
not attempt to govern the resolution of the same-sex marriage issue within
each state, impose a choice of either recognition or non-recognition on the
states, attempt to define marriage for state law purposes, impose any
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for Nebraska to refuse to acknowledge contracts entered into by
same-sex couples prior to entering the state, as legal instruments
cannot be denied recognition based on a public policy
exception.187 Rather, conflicts of laws doctrines require a court to
determine what law to apply to adjudicate a claim.188
Nor is there any “‘roving public policy exception’ to the full
faith and credit due judgments.”189 Cases that are routinely cited
for such an exception were severely limited in scope by the
Supreme Court in Baker v. General Motors Corp.190 There, the
Court stated that “[i]n assuming the existence of a ubiquitous
‘public policy exception’ permitting one State to resist
recognition of another State’s judgment, the District Court . . .
misread our precedent.”191 Accordingly, a decision by one state’s
court to recognize a contract as legally binding is not necessarily
affirmative law regarding the issue or “commandee[r] the legislative processes
of the States”).
187
See MERIN, supra note 7, at 228-31 (discussing the issue of whether a
state can disregard a legal same-sex marriage of another state based on policy
reasons); see also Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy”
in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 980-81 (1956) (discussing
the dubious term “public policy” for a state’s justification for having its own
law applied).
188
For a more expansive discussion of the matters at issue in conflict of
law cases, see generally Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws,
73 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1988) (explaining that conflict of laws is the body of
legal doctrine that seeks to provide a basis for choosing a substantive rule, in
tort or contract, over the conflicting rule of another state).
189
Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (finding
that an injunction, entered by a Michigan county court pursuant to parties’
stipulation in an employee’s wrongful discharge action, barring a former
employee from testifying as a witness did not reach beyond the controversy
between the employee and the manufacturer to control proceedings elsewhere,
and, therefore, the employee could testify in a Missouri products liability case
without violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause). Id.
190
Id. at 234 (finding that there is no public policy exception to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause). See also Kent County v. Shephard, 713 A.2d 290,
296-97 (Md. 1998) (stating that the forum state is not required to give Full
Faith and Credit to the statutes of another state when contemplating an issue
upon which the forum state is competent to legislate).
191
Baker, 522 U.S. at 234.
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one that can be accepted or rejected in another jurisdiction based
on a supposed divergent “public policy.”192
Legislators misstated the law in the Congressional Report on
DOMA, claiming that the “U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a
public policy exception that, in certain circumstances, would
permit a State to decline to give effect to another state’s laws.”193
In fact, one of the two cases Congress relied upon was limited by
the Supreme Court to mean only that “a court may be guided by
the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in determining the law
applicable to a controversy” in court.194 The case at issue,
Nevada v. Hall, speaks only to choice of law.195 There, a vehicle
owned by the State of Nevada was involved in a traffic accident
in California.196 The law of Nevada limited the State’s liability
for tort actions to $25,000.197 California law had no such limit,
and the California state courts chose to apply California law in
the case.198 Addressing the controversy, the Supreme Court stated
that the “Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require one state
192

Id. This question is a matter of significant debate, and the Supreme
Court has not established a bright-line rule for determining what matters will
necessarily fall within the domain of mandatory recognition under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 187, at 98081 (noting traditional but dubious use of the term “public policy” to obscure
“an assertion of the forum’s right to have its [own] law applied to the
[controversy] because of the forum’s relationship to it”).
193
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 9 (1996). This statement was in
reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
424 (1979) (noting the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require States to
apply another’s law in violation of the State’s own public policy). Id. at 9
n.27.
194
See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. In Baker, the Supreme Court invoked
Nevada v. Hall specifically for the proposition that “[a] court may be guided
by the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in determining the law applicable to a
controversy.” Id. (citing Hall, 440 U.S. at 421-24). The Court immediately
clarified this position, stating that Supreme Court precedent “support[s] no
roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments.”
Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)).
195
440 U.S. at 414 (1979). See also Baker, 422 U.S. at 233.
196
Nevada, 440 U.S. at 411.
197
Id. at 412.
198
Id. at 411.
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to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events
within it, the conflicting statute of another state . . .” in the
context of a court proceeding.199
The second case specifically cited in DOMA report dealt with
a similar conflict of laws.200 In Alaska Packers Association v.
Industrial Accident Commission of California the conflict was
whether, in the context of determining a worker’s compensation
award for work-related injuries, “the full faith and credit clause
[sic] require[d] the state of California to give effect to the Alaska
statute rather than its own.”201 Public policy was not an issue,
and the Court examined only which state had greater interest in
the controversy.202 The Court rejected the argument that full faith
and credit required application of Alaska law because the contract
was signed in California and the accident at issue occurred
there.203 Ultimately, California’s interest in enforcing its
compensation act outweighed any competing interests of the State
of Alaska.204
199

Id. at 422-23.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 9 (1996) (citing Alaska Packers Ass’n
v. Industrial Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935), to support the proposition
that “the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a public policy exception that, in
certain circumstances, would permit a State to decline to give effect to another
State’s laws”).
201
294 U.S. at 546 (1935). In Alaska Packers, an employer challenged a
compensation award that was made in conformity with the statutes of
California, where the contract of employment was entered into, rather than
Alaska, where the employment was performed and the injuries occurred. Id. at
550.
202
Id. at 548-49. Specifically, the court noted that it was within the power
of California’s legislature to enact the statute in question and that the state’s
exercise of that power infringed no constitutional provision. Id. at 548. On the
issue of conflicting state interests, the court stated that “[p]rima facie every
state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes . . . One who
challenges that right . . . assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational
basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are
superior to those of the forum.” Id. at 547-48.
203
Id. at 540.
204
Id. at 550 (concluding that “[t]he interest of Alaska is not shown to be
superior to that of California. No persuasive reasoning is shown for denying to
California the right to enforce its own laws in its own court.”).
200
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The second sentence of Initiative 416, insofar as it attempts to
invalidate domestic partnership unions and contracts entered into
in other states, is therefore unconstitutional under current
application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.205 Nebraska
205

Supporters of the Vermont civil unions law have also recognized that
problems may exist for nonresidents who obtain a civil union license in
Vermont but seek to enforce in their home state the rights granted by the civil
union in Vermont. See, e.g., Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Vermont Civil Unions Law to Take Effect: Putting Fairness in Full Swing (June
30, 2000) (stating that it is unclear how home states sill treat civil unions
between residents obtaining a Vermont civil union), available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi_bin/iowa/documents/record?record=656;
Vermont Freedom to Marry Organization (cautioning that it is unknown how
home states will respond to civil unions and encouraging nonresidents to
continue using contractual means to protect their interests), at
http://www.vtfreetomarry.org/civilunions.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
Additionally, the Vermont Secretary of State warns of potential problems
nonresidents may encounter in the dissolution of a civil union. See Vermont
Office of the Secretary of State, The Vermont Guide to Civil Unions, available
http://www.sec.state.vt.us/otherprg/civilunions/civilunions.html
(last
at
visited Jan. 21, 2003) (warning that although dissolution of civil unions is
handled by the Vermont Family Court, there is a residency requirement, and it
is unclear how other states will handle civil union dissolutions).
Furthermore, it appears that states with statutes that conflict with the
Vermont civil union law, or any law providing domestic partnership benefits,
may have a slight barrier in applying state law to the enforcement of such
contracts. The Supreme Court has held that a forum state does not violate the
Full Faith and Credit Clause by electing to apply its own substantive law to a
matter of contract interpretation as long as the forum state has sufficient
contacts with the parties or occurrences that would not render the application
of the law arbitrary or unfair. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981) (allowing Minnesota to apply its law to an insurance contract
executed by Wisconsin drivers in Wisconsin); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408
(1955) (agreeing that an Arkansas court could apply Arkansas law to an
employment contract executed between a Missouri employee and employer);
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (upholding
application of Louisiana law to an action against an insurer on a policy even
though the contract was negotiated and issued in Massachusetts). The common
theme in each of these cases is that the forum state had significant contacts
with the parties, justifying application of its own law.
Another example is Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2002). In Rosengarten, Connecticut residents obtained a civil union in
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cannot refuse to recognize rights or benefits extended to
homosexuals under valid, enforceable contracts enacted in other
states.206 Supreme Court precedent sets forth a method to
determine which state’s law to apply to adjudicate a controversy
regarding an incident, instrument or contract from another state,
but does not permit a state to deny recognition of a contract on
the basis of its fundamental validity. There is no public policy
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause that would permit
them to do so.207
Vermont and sought to dissolve the union under Connecticut family relations
law. Id. at 172-74. The Connecticut court, applying Connecticut family law,
found that the Vermont civil union was not a family relations matter as defined
in the Connecticut statute, and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to
dissolve a civil union not recognized by Connecticut law. Id. at 175-76, 17980.
206
As noted, the argument that such a decision would fall within the
“public policy” exception of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is debatable, and
some commentators have argued that only marriages performed in other states
could be unenforceable if challenged. See, e.g., MERIN, supra note 7, at 231.
But see L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and
Same-Sex “Marriage”: How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?,
32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 30, 36 (1998) (noting the continued vitality of the
public policy exception to choice of law and the ability of states to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages using the exception as a moral objection to
homosexual acts); Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex “Marriage” and the Public
Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 47 (1998) (arguing that a home
state clearly has the right to refuse recognition of an out-of-state same-sex
marriage using the public policy doctrine and that constitutional objections to
such a conclusion based on violation of the Establishment Clause or
discrimination against the sister state are unfounded).
207
Even if the public policy exception were well settled, it could be
considered inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent to invoke the exception
in the context of marriage. See MERIN, supra note 7, at 235. Merin points out
that, even if the public policy exception in the Full Faith and Credit Clause
were available to defend state and federal DOMAs, and these laws “passed
constitutional muster, there are scholars who claim that states would still be
obliged to recognize out-of-state marriages, building on precedents pertaining
to recognition of interracial marriages, according to which it would be wrong
to invoke a public policy exception for same-sex marriages.” Id. at 235 n.289
(citing Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Mark Strasser, For Whom the Bell Tolls:
On Subsequent Domiciles’ Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 66 U.
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V. INITIATIVE 416 AND THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE
The Contracts Clause of the Constitution, mandating that
“[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts” may also present fertile ground for legal challenges
to Initiative 416.208 Gay couples routinely enter into contracts to
provide a measure of security in their relationships.209 These
contracts create, among other things, inheritance rights, powers
of attorney and insurance rights.210 The sum result is a
relationship commonly referred to as a “domestic partnership.”
Some commentators fear that the second sentence of Initiative
416 would bar judicial enforcement of such contracts in the event
that a court interprets them as creating a “domestic partnership”
or “same-sex relationship.”211
A. Current Application of the Contracts Clause
The Contracts Clause applies only to state laws that are very
likely to implicate contracts, and the Supreme Court has
CIN. L. REV. 339 (1998)).
208
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
209
See generally, DUFF, supra note 91 (discussing “spousal equivalent”
contracts); see also Lambda Life Planning, supra note 91 (exploring the
various types of documents drafted to create legal rights and remedies to samesex couples).
210
See Lambda Life Planning, supra note 91 and accompanying text
(illustrating various contracts and legal documents protecting the rights of
same-sex couples).
211
See Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on Most Sweeping Ban on Gay
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at A9 (discussing fear that the
amendment would dissuade employers and insurers from offering health
benefits for same-sex partners, and that government agencies and institutions
would interpret Initiative 416 in such a way as to prevent gays from making
decisions about their hospitalized partners or adoption of their partner’s
children); Leslie Reed, Gays Fear Measure’s Effect on Contracts, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 15, 2000. Reed analogizes marriage to a contract, and
suggests that without honoring the relationship, you cannot honor the contract.
Id. Similarly, contracts held by a gay partner providing benefits might be
legally challenged by “anti-gay groups, by estranged family members or even
by insurance carriers reluctant to pay on a large claim.” Id.
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explicitly declared that it “will not strain to reach a constitutional
question by speculating that [one state’s] courts might in the
future interpret” the law to implicate contracts.212 There is,
however, no leap of reasoning required to find that Initiative 416
will cover contracts between same-sex partners.
The Supreme Court has articulated two standards to examine
claims of state imposed impairment of contracts. The more
stringent rule was outlined in Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus.213 First, there must be a substantial impairment of
contractual rights.214 To be upheld, the impairment must (1)
address an emergency; (2) protect a basic societal interest and not
a favored group; (3) be appropriately tailored; (4) impose only
reasonable conditions on contracts; and (5) be of limited
duration.215 Allied involved a challenge to a Minnesota state law
that targeted a specific corporation and altered its pension

212

Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 189 (1983). In Exxon,
Alabama oil and gas producers sought a declaration that an Alabama statute
increasing severance tax on oil and gas extracted from Alabama wells while
exempting royalty owners from the increase and prohibiting producers from
passing the cost increase on to their consumer-purchasers was unconstitutional.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the royalty-owner exception did not violate
the Contracts Clause because the exemption did not suggest that any
contractual obligations of which appellants were the beneficiaries would be
nullified. Id.
213
438 U.S. 234 (1978). In Allied Structural Steel an employer
challenged a state law, the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, under
which a private employer of 100 or more employees who provided pension
benefits and met other specified requirements, was subject to a “pension
funding charge” if he terminated the plan or closed the Minnesota office. Id.
at 236. The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional as a violation of
the Contracts Clause. Id. at 251.
214
Id. at 245 (“Severe impairment . . . will push the inquiry to a careful
examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation” in light of “the
high value the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts.”). Here,
the court found the Act severe because a basic term of the pension contract
was substantially modified. Id. at 246. The change was one the company
“relied on heavily, and reasonably . . . in calculating its annual contributions
to the pension fund.” Id.
215
Id. at 242.
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contracts,216 expanding the company’s payout obligations to
retired employees.217 The Supreme Court overturned the statute,
finding that it violated each of the requirements of the Contracts
Clause and stating that Minnesota “grossly distorted” the
contractual relationships of the corporation to its employees.218
The second test applicable to laws allegedly impairing
contracts was articulated in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v.
Kansas Power & Light Co.219 The Court did not overturn the
Allied test, but modified it to incorporate the following three
questions: (1) has a substantial impairment of contractual rights
taken place; (2) is there a significant and legitimate public
purpose; (3) if there is a valid public purpose, is the adjustment
of contractual rights appropriate to that public purpose?220 The
Court applied this test to a Kansas law placing price caps on the
sale of natural gas that were more stringent than those to which
suppliers and purchasers agreed.221 There, the substantial
impairment had an important public purpose—protecting
consumers from indefinite price increases due to energy
deregulation.222 The law was appropriately tailored because it
simply slowed price increases and supplemented federal
regulation of intrastate gas prices.223 These cases demonstrate
216

Id. at 239. Specifically, the plaintiff employer challenged the
Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act. The 1974 law provided
that a private employer with at least 100 employees, among which at least one
was a Minnesota resident, was subject to a pension funding charge if he
terminated the pension plan or closed the Minnesota office. MINN. STAT. §
181B.01 (1974).
217
Id. at 240. The Minnesota law “substantially altered those
relationships by superimposing pension obligations upon the company,
conspicuously beyond those that it had voluntarily agreed to undertake.” Id.
218
Id. at 249.
219
459 U.S. 400 (1983).
220
Id. at 411-12.
221
Id. at 413-19.
222
Id. at 417. The Court specifically noted that “Kansas has exercised its
police power to protect consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices
caused by deregulation.” Id.
223
Id. at 417. The Court reasoned that the state had a legitimate interest
in “correcting the imbalance between the interstate and intrastate markets,”
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that, while the Contracts Clause does not obliterate states’ police
power, the Constitution limits the extent to which states can
interfere with contracts.224
B. Application of Contracts Clause Principles to Initiative 416
Analysis of the Nebraska law begins with considering
whether it actually impairs contractual rights. Scrutiny would
then turn on whether adjustment of those contractual rights
furthers a significant and legitimate public interest.
1. Substantial Impairment
The reality of gay couples in the United States is that
contracts are essential mechanisms to delineate relationships,
both between same-sex partners and gay employees and their
employers.225 Therefore any court reviewing Initiative 416 need
not “speculate” that the law will apply to same-sex relationships
because it was “coordinat[ing] the intrastate and interstate prices by
supplementing the federal Act’s regulation of intrastate gas.” Id. The Court
further justified the Kansas act by stating that Congress had contemplated this
type of supplementation, as evidenced in the House and Senate Conference
Reports on the federal act. The court quoted the conference reports which
stated that the federal act was not to invalidate any State’s authority to
establish or enforce any maximum lawful price for sales of gas in intrastate
commerce, including any indefinite price escalator clause, not exceeding the
applicable maximum lawful price, if any, under Title I of the Act. Id. at 417
(quoting S. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1126, at 124-25 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 951752, at 124-25 (1978)).
224
See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 428 U.S. 234, 240 (1978)
(noting that the Contracts Clause “is not, however, the Draconian provision
that its words might seem to imply”); see also Samuel R. Olken, Charles
Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical Study of Contract
Clause Jurisprudence, 72 OR. L. REV. 513, 516 (1993) (providing a historical
analysis of the Contracts Clause jurisprudence to suggest that the Supreme
Court has tried to keep states from interfering with contracts while recognizing
the importance of state governmental police powers).
225
See Lambda Life Planning, supra note 91 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of contracts and other legal documents created to protect
and define the rights and obligations of same-sex couples).
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built upon contracts.226
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis the
Supreme Court addressed a law that did not directly implicate
contractual relations but had a substantial impact on them.227 The
law at issue required coal-mining companies to leave fifty percent
of coal in mines to prevent dangerous cave-ins at the surface.228
Coal mining companies routinely owned or leased subsurface
mineral rights, and the surface owners faced the risk of caveins.229 Because the statute required that certain amounts of coal be
226

As noted, the Supreme Court has declared that it will refuse to
speculate as to whether a legislative scheme will interfere with contract rights.
See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 189 (1983).
227
480 U.S. 470 (1987). The primary purpose of the law at issue in
DeBenedictis was to impose financial liability on mine operators that caused
damage. Id. at 486. Although this has a secondary effect on contractual
negotiations because it prevented operators from holding surface owners to
their contractual waiver of liability for surface damage, the Court found that
Pennsylvania had appropriately exercised its police power. Id. at 488, 502.
228
Id. Specifically, the act mandated that fifty percent of the coal beneath
certain structures remain in place and provided that if removal damaged these
designated structures, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources could revoke the operator’s mining permit. Id. at 477. Coal
companies challenged the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act as a violation of the
Takings and Contracts clauses of the Constitution. Id. See also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10; U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 6. To prevent revocation, operators
had to either repair the damage within six months, satisfy any claims arising
from the damage or deposit as security the cost of the repairs. Keystone, 480
U.S. at 477.
229
Id. When coal is mined and extracted, the strata and land surface
lower. Id. at 474. This lowering can have adverse effects on the structural
integrity of buildings and houses, as well as the ability to successfully farm
land, and can cause losses to groundwater and surface ponds. Id. at 474-75.
Since 1966, Pennsylvania has restricted the amount of coal that can be
extracted in order to prevent these problems. Id. at 475-76. The Pennsylvania
Subsidence Act furthered legislation by prohibiting mining that caused damage
to “public buildings and noncommercial buildings generally used by the
public, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries.” PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.6 (West 1986). The Court in Keystone held that
Pennsylvania’s legislature had a legitimate interest in preventing this damage
and the legislative response was a valid exercise of police power. Keystone,
480 U.S. at 486, 488.
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left in the ground, mining companies could not reap the full
benefits of the land rights they had purchased or leased, and the
Court found that contract rights were indirectly, but substantially,
affected.230 The Court upheld the law, however, because it
addressed and was appropriately tailored to an essential public
purpose—preventing dangerous subsidence.231 Similarly, although
the text of Initiative 416 does not specifically mention same-sex
contracts, the broad language and potential applications of the
amendment threaten the enforceability of these contracts.
2. Public Interest
Initiative 416 is not founded upon the protection of a valid
public interest, and consideration of whether it is appropriately
tailored is therefore unnecessary.232 States are entitled to void
contracts to uphold moral standards, but there is no such standard
at issue in same-sex relationships.233 Non-marital cohabitation
230

Id. at 504-05. The Court agreed with petitioners’ claim that the statute
substantially impaired contract rights because it prevented petitioners from
waiving liability for land surface damage. Id. at 504. The Court also found a
“significant and legitimate public purpose” in preventing the type of harm
caused by the mining and extraction of coal. Id. at 505. To balance these
competing interests, the Court followed its precedent of deferring to legislative
judgment when the state is not a contracting party. Id. at 505 (citing Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413
(1983); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977)).
231
Id. at 505.
232
See supra Parts II.B, III.B (analyzing and rejecting any potentially
arguable legitimate public interest furthered by Initiative 416 by exploring the
legitimate intent and history of Initiative 416 and illustrating why the law
could not pass the rational basis test under Equal Protection jurisprudence).
233
For example, a court can overturn a contract that is based on a
promise to breach another contract, because the Contracts Clause would not be
implicated. See Burgess v. Gateway Communications, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d
888 (S.D.W.V. 1998). Many courts and commentators have rejected the
contention that homosexuality is “immoral” in any legal context. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2002). The court
noted that:
Social tolerance for non-coercive deviant sexual acts, such as
heterosexual sodomy between spouses and homosexual activity
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agreements are enforceable in Nebraska.234 The only moral issue
presented to a Nebraska court enforcing cohabitation agreements
is that they cannot be based on an exchange of money or lodging
for sexual intercourse.235 Furthermore, Nebraska does not have a
public policy against homosexuality in general, as evidenced by
the fact that sodomy has been decriminalized,236 sexual
orientation has been rejected as a factor in child custody cases237
and state non-discrimination laws are applied to harassment
claims.238
Although Nebraska’s courts have not addressed same-sex
relationships or co-habitation agreements, courts in other
jurisdictions have found them to comply with public policy.239
between consenting adults, has increased to the point where these acts
have been decriminalized in many nations and in many states of the
United States. Even where they remain prohibited, efforts at
enforcement are perfunctory at best.
Id. The Williams court also noted that the influential Kinsey sex studies
revealed that “men and women regularly and widely engaged in . . .
sodomy . . .” and that “[t]he findings of these studies served to demonstrate
that what was once considered ‘deviant’ is in fact quite normal and common.
As a result, American attitudes about sexuality changed drastically . . . .” Id.
234
See Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77 (Neb. 1981).
235
Id. at 703 (noting that if a contract includes consideration of sexual
intercourse it is void as against public policy).
236
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-704 (repealed 1978).
237
See Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that “sexual activity by a parent, whether it is heterosexual or
homosexual, is governed by the rule that to establish a material change in
circumstances justifying a change in custody there must be a showing that the
minor child or children were exposed to such activity or were adversely
affected or damaged by reason of such activity”).
238
See Op. Neb. Att’y Gen. 96044 (1996) (stating that Nebraska’s nondiscrimination law’s “gender-neutral definition demonstrates [that] there is
nothing . . . to limit . . . sexual harassment to heterosexual harassment”
because there is the “possibility [of] sexual harassment of men by women, or
men by other men, or women by other women . . .”).
239
For example, many states have amended their laws to grant adoption
and custody rights to gay couples or parents, and numerous judicial decrees
have granted similar protection and rights to gays and lesbians throughout the
country. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (holding that
unmarried, cohabiting couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual, could
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For example, the California Court of Appeals enforced a
cohabitation agreement between same-sex partners.240 The court
stated that “[a]dults who voluntarily live together and engage in
sexual relations are competent to contract respecting their
earnings and property rights.”241 There is little support,
therefore, for the argument that Initiative 416 codifies existing
public policy against homosexuality or non-marital relations.
Initiative 416 does not rest upon any public purpose sufficient to
justify denying recognition of contracts between gay partners.
petition for adoption of a child); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37
(S.D. 1994) (holding that a custodial parent’s sexual orientation is not a per se
showing of lack of fitness); see also Karla J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexual
Couples: A Look at Differing State Court Opinions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1497
(1998) (discussing adoption rights of homosexual couples in different
jurisdictions).
240
See Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988)
(reversing the trial court’s conclusion that an oral contract between
homosexual partners was unenforceable and finding that, over the course of a
seven year relationship, the plaintiff established “alleged consideration for the
purported contract substantially independent of sexual services”). But see
Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d. 1097 (11th Cir. 1997). In Shahar, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit permitted the rescission of an employment
offer by the Georgia Attorney General based on the applicants lesbian
“marriage.” Id. at 1099. This decision is significant because it allowed a
private solemnization of a relationship to dictate a legal outcome, inasmuch as
the Georgia Attorney General’s disapproval and concerns about the lesbian
relationship provided legal justification to fire the plaintiff. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit refused to recognize that intimate associational rights to extend to gay
relationships. Id. at 1106. The court questioned the plaintiff’s judgment,
saying that she “seemingly did not appreciate the importance of appearances
and the need to avoid bringing ‘controversy’ to the Department, the Attorney
General lost confidence in her ability to make good judgments for the
Department.” Id. at 1105-06. The court analogized refusing employment to a
partnered lesbian to refusing employment to a member of the Klu Klux Klan.
Id. at 1108.
The decision raises the possibility that Nebraska courts could find private
agreements between contracting gay partners unenforceable. Hawaii foresaw
just this type of interference with private relationships, and specifically
exempted private solemnization of gay relationships from the purview of its
laws. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The drafters of Initiative
416 either did not foresee this potential or chose to ignore it.
241
See Whorton, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
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CONCLUSION
Nebraska voters passed a law that some predict will bring the
issue of equality for gays before the Supreme Court.242 Indeed,
the questions presented by Initiative 416 are perhaps even more
distinct than in Romer v. Evans.243 Romer pitted persons united
242

Immediately after Initiative 416 was passed, the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) began preparations to challenge to the amendment.
See John Barrette, Bush-Gore Battle Not the Only Post Election Court Battle
in the Works, NEB. STATE PAPER, November 30, 2000; John Fulwider, ACLU
Hopes to Have 416 in Court by January, NEB. ST. PAPER, November 19,
2000; John Fulwider, Legal Challenge of 416 in Very Early Stage, NEB. ST.
PAPER, November 9, 2000. Progress on the lawsuit has moved slowly,
however, and recent developments in the state have arguably frustrated the
effort. For example, when the Nebraska Supreme Court barred the adoption of
a lesbian woman’s child by her female partner in March of 2002, the ACLU
decided to accept the ruling and abandon any option for appeal. See John
Fulwider, Lesbian Asks High Court OK to Adopt Partner’s Son, NEB. ST.
PAPER, October 2, 2001. After the decision, Executive Director of the
Nebraska ACLU Tim Butz stated that the ruling, “when coupled with
Initiative 416, just made the family feel like they were not wanted in this state.
They decided not to fight it, and just move on.” See John Fulwider, ACLU
Won’t Appeal Gay Adoption Ruling, NEB. ST. PAPER, March 18, 2002.
Nevertheless, efforts to challenge the Amendment continue through the
support of the ACLU and social-justice organizations in Nebraska such as
Citizens for Equal Protection (CFEP) and Parents, Families and Friends of
Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG). These groups have collaborated with attorneys
from the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Nebraska as they
prepare to address the law. Currently, their efforts include attempts to find
examples of where the law is being applied and how it harms gay couples by
banning recognition of their relationships. For further information about the
efforts, see generally PFLAG Lincoln-Cornhusker, at http://pflag.ineb.org
(last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
243
517 U.S. 620 (1996). It is interesting to note, however, that during the
heated litigation of Romer, the plaintiffs sought to strike a sympathetic cord
with the courts by stressing that the Colorado law was motivated primarily by
philosophical opposition to homosexuality rather than any legitimate
government interest. Id. For a thoughtful analysis of the efforts of the Romer
litigants in the context of the contemporaneous religious conservative
movement, see Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, Romer v. Evans and the
Amendment 2 Controversy: The Rhetoric and Reality of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in America, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 261 (2002). According
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by sexual orientation against all other classes of people, whereas
Initiative 416 makes a clear distinction between homosexuals and
heterosexuals, with no basis that one group is more deserving of
protection than the other. Thus, a court addressing Nebraska’s
amendment would reach the heart of constitutional issues
involving gays. Any decision striking down the second sentence
of this broad law would limit states’ power to regulate gay
marriage. It would also send a strong message to states that they
must establish sound bases for legislation that distinguishes
between homosexuals and heterosexuals. The Nebraska
Amendment is vulnerable to a legal challenge; litigation would
ensure that Initiative 416 is subjected to the scrutiny it merits and
escaped in the popular initiative process.244

to Alexander, the Romer plaintiffs provided the texts for all the statutes that
would be invalidated by the Amendment and the text of communications
between supporters of the Amendment that displayed a hateful nature and antigay sentiments. Id. at 285.
Whether Romer was an unequivocal victory for gay rights advocates,
however, is a matter of some debate. See Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual
Discrimination and Gender: Was Romer v. Evans Really a Victory for Gay
Rights?, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 271 (1999) (summarizing Justice Scalia’s
critique of the majority opinion because it “undermin[ed] democracy when
homosexuals had the full right to participate in the process”); William C.
Duncan, The Legacy of Romer v. Evans—So Far, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161
(2001) (suggesting that the opinion has not had a major impact on the law and
that early predictions about the achievements of Romer have not been
vindicated by courts).
244
As noted, Initiative 416 was passed by popular referendum. See supra
Part II (discussing the legislative background of Initiative 416 and margin by
which Nebraska’s voters adopted the amendment).

